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ABSTRACT 
Consent decrees raise serious Article III concerns.  When litigants agree on their rights and jointly 
seek the same relief from a court, they are no longer adverse and a justiciable controversy no longer 
exists between them.  In the absence of an actual controversy between opposing parties, it is both 
inappropriate and unnecessary for a court to issue a substantive order declaring or modifying the 
litigants’ rights.  Whether Article III’s adverseness requirement is seen as jurisdictional or 
prudential, federal courts should decline to issue consent decrees and instead require litigants that 
wish to voluntarily resolve a case to execute a settlement agreement, which, as a private contract, 
does not implicate the same justiciability problems.  
Consent decrees raise unique separation-of-powers issues in lawsuits against government entities 
concerning the validity, proper interpretation, or enforcement of statutes or regulations.  
Government agencies and officials may accede to such decrees to entrench their policy preferences 
against future change, impose legal restrictions and obligations on their successors, and constrain 
those successors’ discretion—all without a court determining that such relief is legally necessary.  
Such concerns would not arise if government defendants resolved such cases through settlement 
agreements, because the reserved powers doctrine and general prohibition on specific enforcement of 
government contracts prevent government entities from using settlement agreements to improperly 
limit their (and their successors’) discretion and authority.   
If courts are not willing to refuse to categorically decline to issue consent decrees on Article III 
grounds then, at a minimum, they should require litigants in government-defendant cases to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated valid claims and that the requested relief is required to 
remedy the legal violations at issue.  Courts must ensure that government defendants do not use 
consent decrees to circumvent the traditional legislative and regulatory processes and establish 
binding requirements for which there is not actually any constitutional or legal basis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt ordered the Bu-
reau of Land Management (“BLM”) to prepare an inventory of 5.7 
million acres of federal land in Utah to determine whether any of it 
was “wilderness.”1  The State of Utah and other plaintiffs sued to en-
join the inventory, but the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit held that they lacked standing to bring their challenge 
because the inventory would not cause them any injury-in-fact.2 
A few years later, shortly before the end of Secretary Babbitt’s 
tenure, BLM issued a handbook that extended the rules and protec-
tions governing wilderness areas to other BLM-designated regions 
that were similar to wilderness, but did not meet certain technical 
statutory requirements for being categorized as such.3  The State of 
Utah challenged both BLM’s designation of these quasi-wilderness 
areas and its decision to treat them like wilderness.4  Several envi-
ronmental groups moved to intervene in the case to defend BLM’s 
actions.5 
The day after the environmental groups filed their intervention 
motion, the State of Utah and BLM—now under a new presidential 
administration—submitted a proposed consent decree declaring that 
BLM lacked statutory authority to continue conducting wilderness in-
ventories, prohibiting BLM from designating new wilderness or quasi-
wilderness areas, rescinding the handbook, and stipulating that the 
rules and protections governing wilderness could not apply to quasi-
wilderness areas.6  The district court entered the proposed order.7 
By entering into the consent decree, the new Administration at-
tempted to lock in its narrow interpretation of the federal laws gov-
erning wilderness areas8 and allow the plaintiffs to obtain broader re-
lief than the court itself could have ordered.  For example, BLM 
agreed in the consent decree that it lacked the authority to perform 
new wilderness inventories,9 despite the facts that it recently had con-
 
 1 Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1998).  For a detailed treatment of this 
incident, see Sarah Krakoff, Settling the Wilderness, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1159, 1166–68 
(2004). 
 2 Babbitt, 137 F.3d at 1214–15. 
 3 Utah v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 535 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 4 Id. at 1189–90. 
 5 Id. at 1190. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 1191. 
 8 See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711–12, 1782 (2006). 
 9 Dep’t of Interior, 535 F.3d at 1190. 
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ducted such an inventory and that the Tenth Circuit had held that 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge it.10 
One commentator argued, 
[I]t seem[s] as if the [Bush] Administration was pursuing a “Trojan 
Horse” approach to changing public land policy:  first inviting litigation 
from industry; then, once a case was filed, avoiding a court decision on 
the merits through settlement agreements that gave the industry every-
thing it could have hoped for through litigation, while undermining en-
vironmental controls in the process.11 
That critique is unduly narrow.  Local, state, and federal agencies 
and officials of both political parties, as defendants in litigation, have 
entered into consent decrees—often with ideologically aligned inter-
est groups—in a wide variety of contexts.  Such decrees allow agen-
cies and officials to achieve and entrench policy outcomes that would 
have been difficult or impossible through the legislative or regulatory 
process.12 
Most academic analysis of consent decrees focuses on so-called 
“structural” or “institutional” decrees, which mandate “broad policy 
changes, substantial administrative reorganizations, or large increases 
in institutional expenditures . . . for, among other things, desegregat-
ing school systems, improving prison conditions, decentralizing pub-
lic mental health institutions, . . . [and] expanding special education 
 
 10 Utah v. Babbitt, 137 F.3d 1193, 1214–15 (10th Cir. 1998).  The district court in Department 
of Interior ultimately allowed the environmental groups to intervene, and they succeeded 
in having the consent decree vacated.  535 F.3d at 1191.  Such third-party intervenors, 
however, are not always available.  Furthermore, many state and federal courts do not al-
low private intervenors to join pending cases to defend legal enactments when a govern-
mental defendant fails to do so, particularly when they lack Article III standing.  See infra 
Section IV.B.  Even when such groups are permitted to join a case, they often cannot pre-
vent the court from approving a consent decree.  See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Fire-
fighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 502 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor . . . does not 
have the power to block the decree merely by withholding its consent.”). 
 11 Michael C. Blumm, The Bush Administration’s Sweetheart Settlement Policy:  A Trojan Horse 
Strategy for Advancing Commodity Production on Public Lands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10397, 10397 
(2004); see also Krakoff, supra note 1, at 1160–61 (arguing that the Bush Administration’s 
strategy of “settling environmental disputes” through consent decrees and other means 
“raises questions of constitutional significance”).  The Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) under the Reagan Administration also was accused of entering into “sweetheart” 
consent decrees with industry.  Justin Vickers, Note, Res Judicata Claim Preclusion of Properly 
Filed Citizen Suits, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1623, 1627 (2010). 
 12 Ideological opponents of an administration also sometimes use the threat of prolonged, 
burdensome, and publicity-generating litigation to compel governmental defendants to 
enter into consent decrees that provide greater relief than those groups could have ob-
tained in court.  See, e.g., Eric A. Rosand, Consent Decrees in Welfare Litigation:  The Obstacles 
to Compliance, 28 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 83, 83–84, 101 (1994) (stating that consent 
decrees allow plaintiffs in cases concerning welfare programs to obtain relief “that proba-
bly could not have been ordered by a court”). 
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programs.”13  A voluminous body of literature14 and case law15 address 
the numerous problems that can arise from federal courts overseeing 
(and sometimes micromanaging) public institutions, potentially for 
decades, under institutional consent decrees. 
Far less attention has been given to the numerous issues implicat-
ed by non-institutional consent decrees—decrees that arise from cas-
es challenging a particular legal provision, policy, administrative de-
termination, or discrete executive action.16  For example, a decree 
 
 13 Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
1020, 1020–21 (1986). 
 14 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker:  Superintending Structural Change in 
Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 46 (1979) (arguing that institutional reform litigation 
requires the judge to assume the role of “political powerbroker”); William A. Fletcher, 
The Discretionary Constitution:  Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 
637 (1982) (“[S]ince trial court remedial discretion in institutional suits is inevitably po-
litical in nature, it must be regarded as presumptively illegitimate.”); Gerald E. Frug, The 
Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 788–89 (1978) (“A court cannot weigh 
the competing demands for government resources to determine how much can be raised 
for the institutions . . . .”); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change:  Judicial 
Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1294–95, 1305 (arguing that gov-
ernment “defendants are sometimes happy to be sued and happier still to lose” when a 
consent decree is “a shortcut around political constraints”); Christopher Serkin, Public 
Entrenchment Through Private Law:  Binding Local Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 897 
(2011) (arguing that, in “institutional-reform litigation,” a consent decree “may not em-
body [a] negotiated compromise over a genuine dispute but instead lock in the results of 
collaboration between the government and a particular interest group”); see also Abram 
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1297 (1976) 
(explaining that equitable relief in public law cases often resembles a legislative act); see 
generally ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE:  WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT (2003). 
 15 See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (noting that “institutional reform in-
junctions often raise sensitive federalism concerns” and can have “the effect of dictating 
state or local budget priorities”); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 385 (1996) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“Article III cannot be understood to authorize the Federal Judiciary to take 
control of core state institutions like prisons, schools, and hospitals, and assume respon-
sibility for making the difficult policy judgments that state officials are both constitution-
ally entitled and uniquely qualified to make.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:  Constitu-
tional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
203, 276–77 (1987) (identifying certain types of consent decrees to which governmental 
litigants should not be permitted to consent); David W. Swift, A State’s Power to Enter Into a 
Consent Decree that Violates State Law Provisions:  What “Findings” of a Federal Violation are Suf-
ficient to Justify a Consent Decree that Trumps State Law?, 10 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 37, 41 
(2004) (arguing that federal courts generally may approve consent decrees sought by 
state officials or agencies, but may approve decrees permitting or requiring violations of 
state law only if “such a remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law”).  Many of 
the seminal works on this issue appeared in a 1987 symposium in the University of Chicago 
Legal Forum.  See Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 
1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 31, 33 (arguing that a government litigant should not be per-
mitted to enter into a consent decree requiring it to take actions that it would lack the au-
thority to perform in the absence of the decree); Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elec-
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may bar a governmental defendant from enforcing a particular stat-
ute, regulation, or ordinance, either generally or under certain cir-
cumstances, on purportedly constitutional grounds.17  Or it may stipu-
late that certain regulations or other administrative issuances are 
illegal because they violate the agency’s organic statute or some other 
substantive law, or the process through which they were enacted did 
not fully comply with the Administrative Procedure Act or other de-
liberative requirements.18  Still other decrees require the signatory to 
promulgate or modify regulations or other issuances, typically by a 
certain date;19 seek particular legislation;20 enforce certain statutes or 
 
tions?  Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies from Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
295, 302 (arguing that government defendants may submit to a consent decree if the 
court could have imposed a comparable order following adversarial litigation); Robert V. 
Percival, The Bounds of Consent:  Consent Decrees, Settlements and Federal Environmental Policy 
Making, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 351 (stating that the Justice Department’s restrictions 
on consent decrees in cases against the government “discourages settlements” by unrea-
sonably restricting the range of commitments the government may offer in settlement of 
litigation”); Peter Shane, Federal Policy Making By Consent Decree:  An Analysis of Agency and 
Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 272 (arguing that agencies should have 
broad discretion to enter into consent decrees that limit their statutorily conferred dis-
cretion); see also Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against State Gov-
ernmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1796, 1803–04 (1988) (concluding that the same 
federalism-related factors “that weigh against the granting of equitable relief in the form 
of an injunction” against a state entitie “should also militate against a federal court’s en-
tering or enforcing the identical measures in the form of a consent decree”). 
 17 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Cortes, 378 F. App’x 135, 137 (3d Cir. 2010) (reaffirming the validity 
of a consent decree overriding a statutory deadline by which minor political parties to file 
ballot access petitions); Adens for Green v. Schweiker, 773 F.2d 545, 547–48 (3d Cir. 
1985) (discussing a consent decree invalidating an intestacy law concerning illegitimate 
children); ACORN v. New Orleans, 606 F. Supp. 16, 18 n.1 (E.D. La. 1984) (discussing a 
consent decree invalidating “a permit scheme for charitable solicitation”). 
 18 See, e.g., Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 834 F. Supp. 2d 
1004, 1010 (D. Haw. 2011) (approving a consent decree vacating regulations concerning 
loggerhead and leatherback sea turtles because they were based on an allegedly insuffi-
cient biological opinion); Home Builders Ass’ns of N. Cal. v. Noron, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 
(D.D.C. 2002) (approving a consent decree vacating critical habitat designation for the 
California red-legged frog). 
 19 See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Franklin, 989 F.2d 54, 58, 61 
(1st Cir. 1993) (affirming a consent decree that required the Secretary of Commerce to 
create and implement a groundfish rebuilding plan if the regional fishery management 
council failed to do so); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1579–80 (2d Cir. 1985) (en-
forcing a consent decree requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
“promulgate regulations which are in accordance with the decree”); Ferrell v. Pierce, 743 
F.2d 454, 465–66 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming a consent decree requiring the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) to adopt a particular mortgage fore-
closure relief program); Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1121 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983) (affirming the validity of a consent decree requiring the EPA to “promulgate 
guidelines and limitations governing the discharge by 21 industries of 65 specified pollu-
tants”); Wildearth Guardians v. Jackson, No. 11-cv-00001-CMA-MEH, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 109800, at *4, *13 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2011) (approving a consent decree establish-
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regulations—either in general, or with regard to particular targets;21 
or take other specified discrete acts.22  As government agencies in-
creasingly hire “cause lawyers” from both sides of the political spec-
trum who seek to promote ideological or social goals, consent de-
crees may be used even more frequently to effectively nullify 
disfavored laws and regulations, entrench preferred policies, and in-
cur enforcement-related obligations that future administrations will 
be hard-pressed to undo or avoid.23 
The Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”), in a still-binding 1999 opinion that has been mentioned in 
only a handful of articles24 and has never been subjected to academic 
scrutiny, vigorously defended the practice of government defendants 
executing consent decrees.25  It concluded that “[i]n general . . . the 
Attorney General is free to enter into settlements that would limit the 
future exercise of executive branch discretion when that discretion 
 
ing a schedule by which the EPA must either approve improvement plans governing re-
gional haze that had been submitted by various states, or issue its own federal improve-
ment plan). 
 20 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 351 F.3d 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing a 
consent decree “requiring the state Department of Transportation to seek legislation in-
stituting an inspection program” for vehicle emissions); Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Pa. Pub. 
Util. Comm’n, 210 F. Supp. 2d 689, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“The parties entered into a 
Consent Decree under which the Commonwealth defendants were obligated to seek leg-
islation establishing and implementing” a vehicle emissions program.). 
 21 See, e.g., Bragg v. Robertson, 83 F. Supp. 2d 713, 718 (S.D. W. Va. 2000) (approving con-
sent decree requiring the director of the state environmental protection division to “en-
force state surface mining laws”). 
 22 See, e.g., Chisom v. Jindal, No. 86-4075, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130153, at *12–13 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 1, 2012) (interpreting a consent judgment requiring the State to create new districts 
for the election of state supreme court justices); Indus. Commc’ns & Elecs., Inc. v. Town 
of Alton, 710 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193–96 (D.N.H. 2010) (discussing a consent decree requir-
ing defendant municipality to issue a zoning variance); Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 
1535, 1539 (3d Cir. 1984) (rejecting a challenge to a consent decree requiring federal 
agencies to facilitate the rehabilitation of certain townhouses “with maximal participation 
by interested members of the public”). 
 23 See Douglas NeJaime, Cause Lawyers Inside the State, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 654 (2012) 
(“By drawing on state power, cause lawyers in government positions may make the state a 
more favorable context in which to pursue movement goals . . . .”). 
 24 See Krakoff, supra note 1, at 1187 n.177; Todd David Peterson, Protecting the Appropriations 
Power:  Why Congress Should Care About Settlements at the Department of Justice, 2009 BYU L. 
REV. 327, 347 n.98; Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure:  The Pub-
lic Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1035 n.77 (2001); see also Edward T. 
Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 374 n.228 (2008). 
 25 Memorandum from Acting Assistant Attorney General Randolph D. Moss to Associate 
Attorney General Raymond C. Fisher (June 15, 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/consent_decrees2.htm (last accessed Feb. 20, 2013) [hereinafter “OLC Consent De-
cree Opinion”]. 
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has been conferred pursuant to statute.”26  Thus, although DOJ has 
special approval mechanisms for consent decrees in many types of 
government-defendant cases,27 it generally does not view them as 
problematic. 
This Article contends that consent decrees raise serious Article III 
concerns due to the lack of adverseness between or among the par-
ties seeking them.  When parties have reached accord as to the prop-
er disposition of a lawsuit, there is no longer a live controversy for a 
court to resolve.  Rather than entering a consent decree, the court 
should require the parties to memorialize their understanding in a 
settlement agreement—i.e., a private contract—and dismiss the case 
without entering a substantive order that specifies or alters the par-
ties’ legal rights and obligations. 
Although the legal consequences of settlement agreements and 
consent decrees differ, those distinctions often have limited practical 
impact on litigants.  In government-defendant cases,28 however, the 
distinction can be crucial.  Contracts that purport to limit govern-
ment agencies’ or officials’ statutory discretion often are unenforcea-
ble under the reserved powers doctrine, and potentially even the sov-
ereign acts doctrine, and seldom are subject to specific 
enforcement.29  Because consent decrees are court orders, however, 
government agencies and officials can use them to bind their (and 
their successors’) discretion in ways that otherwise would be unen-
forceable.  Likewise, because courts are not required to consider the 
merits of most proposed consent decrees before approving them,30 
government defendants may use them to create and entrench re-
quirements and restrictions that lack a valid constitutional or statuto-
ry basis. 
Some commentators argue that consent decrees in government-
defendant cases violate Article II.  This Article demonstrates that, in 
addition to the underlying lack of adverseness that applies to all con-
sent decrees, the unique concerns that arise with consent decrees in 
 
 26 Id. 
 27 Memorandum from Edwin Meese III, Attorney General, to All Assistant Attorneys Gen-
eral and All United States Attorneys 3, 4 (Mar. 13, 1986), reprinted in U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL POL’Y, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION 150, 152–
53 (Feb. 19, 1988) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 0.160(c)(3)–(5)). 
 28 The term “government,” as used in this Article, includes federal, state, and municipal 
governments, unless context dictates otherwise.  References to suits against government 
officials mean suits naming them in their official capacity.  The term “government de-
fendant” embraces counterclaim and third-party defendants, as well. 
 29 See infra Section IV.A. 
 30 Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986). 
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government-defendant cases are purely statutory, rather than consti-
tutional.  It further argues that, whether on justiciability or statutory 
grounds, courts should refuse to enter consent decrees in govern-
ment-defendant cases.  Recognizing that courts may be reluctant to 
adopt such an extreme reform, this Article also offers an alternate 
approach for considering proposed consent decrees in such cases31—
drawing on diverse fields such as civil procedure,32 criminal proce-
dure,33 and antitrust34—to ensure that they are not used to improperly 
evade the traditional legislative or regulatory processes. 
As suggested earlier, this Article’s main focus is non-institutional 
consent decrees—consent decrees aimed primarily at the validity, in-
terpretation, or enforcement of particular legal provisions,35 deci-
sions, or actions of governmental entities.  The distinction between 
such orders and institutional consent decrees is somewhat subjective, 
however, and much of this Article’s analysis likely applies to institu-
tional decrees, as well.36 
Part I begins by explaining the law governing consent decrees and 
demonstrates that such decrees raise greater concerns than other 
procedural vehicles through which parties may seek judicial relief 
without contesting certain issues.  Part II challenges federal courts’ 
authority under Article III to enter such decrees at all, due to the ab-
sence of adverseness between the parties seeking such orders.  Part 
III demonstrates that consent decrees raise special concerns in gov-
ernment-defendant cases, allowing government agencies and officials 
to make commitments to which they lack legal authority to agree.  In 
contrast to some earlier commentators, this Part argues that the prob-
lem generally lies in a lack of statutory authorization, rather than in-
fringing on the President’s Article II prerogatives.37 
 
 31 See infra Part IV. 
 32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e), 24. 
 33 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3626(c) (2006). 
 34 See Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). 
 35 This Article uses the phrase “legal provision” broadly to refer to a statute, regulation, or-
dinance, or policy at the federal, state, or local level. 
 36 This Article does not address the related, but conceptually distinct, problems associated 
with monetary settlements in government-defendant cases.  See Peterson, supra note 24, at 
332 (“[T]he settlement authority of the Department of Justice creates continuing loop-
holes in Congress’s appropriations authority.”). 
 37 Specifically, this Part argues that Article II prohibits only consent decrees that purport to 
restrict a power that the Constitution specifically and directly confers upon the President 
without legislative intermediation, such as the pardon power.  Article II does not similarly 
bar the vast majority of decrees, which impose limits, requirements, or conditions on 
statutorily conferred discretion. 
646 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
Part IV proposes a variety of remedies for these challenges.38  It 
begins by arguing that, under Article III, courts should not entertain 
requests for consent decrees due to lack of adverseness, but rather 
require litigants to execute settlement agreements.  This would be 
particularly beneficial in government-defendant cases, because a 
range of doctrines limits the enforceability of contracts through 
which governmental entities improperly attempt to contract away 
their statutory powers or discretion.39 
In the event courts are not willing to completely discontinue the 
use of consent decrees, they should require a litigant seeking such a 
decree in a government-defendant case to demonstrate that the 
plaintiff has stated valid claims, and that the requested relief is neces-
sary to remedy the legal violations at issue.  Courts also should loosen 
the requirements for intervention in such cases.  Through adversarial 
presentation of the issues, an intervenor can help ensure that a pro-
posed decree satisfies these suggested new standards and, if neces-
sary, take an appeal.  Such precautions would help ensure that gov-
ernment defendants do not use consent decrees to exceed the scope 
of their statutorily delegated authority.  Part V briefly concludes. 
I.  CONSENT DECREES IN CONTEXT 
This Part lays the foundation for the rest of the Article by explain-
ing the law governing consent decrees.  Section A discusses the lax 
standards courts apply when considering proposed consent decrees, 
with a particular focus on the various approaches courts take when a 
proposed decree would prohibit a government litigant from enforc-
ing a statute on purported constitutional grounds.  This Section also 
explains the stringent requirements the Supreme Court has estab-
lished for modifying consent decrees.  Section B places consent de-
crees in their broader context, contrasting them with other proce-
dural vehicles parties may use to attempt to obtain substantive court 
 
 38 Because many of these proposals are equally applicable to state courts, the concepts men-
tioned in this discussion should be understood as including their state-level analogues, as 
well. 
 39 As discussed later, a future administration is free to abide by a settlement agreement if it 
agrees with its predecessor’s interpretation of the law.  See infra Section IV.A.  If, however, 
the future administration concludes that the restrictions imposed by the settlement 
agreement are not legally or constitutionally appropriate, then the agency may resume 
the challenged actions, and either the same plaintiffs or new ones may continue the un-
derlying litigation or file a new case.  If a court, following adversarial litigation, concludes 
that the government defendant’s actions or policies are improper, it may issue appropri-
ate injunctive and other relief to prevent recurrences. 
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orders without having the court pass on the merits of a case, or cer-
tain issues within a case. 
A.  The Law of Consent Decrees 
When government defendants settle lawsuits against them, they 
often do so through consent decrees.  A consent decree is a court or-
der that terminates a lawsuit (or certain claims in a lawsuit) and im-
poses obligations on one or both litigants.40  It is enforceable through 
summary contempt proceedings before the court that issued it,41 ra-
ther than in a separate breach-of-contract suit like a settlement 
agreement.42  A court may approve a consent decree among the liti-
gants that agree to it, even if other parties to the lawsuit, including 
intervenors, object.43 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that a consent decree draws 
its force from “the agreement of the parties, rather than the force of 
the law upon which the complaint was originally based.”44  In decid-
ing whether to approve a consent decree, a court does not determine 
whether “the plaintiff established his factual claims and legal theo-
ries.”45  Thus, a court may enter a consent decree against a govern-
ment defendant without finding that a statutory or constitutional vio-
lation has occurred,46 “inquir[ing] into the precise legal rights of the 
parties,” or “reach[ing] and resolv[ing] the merits of the claims or 
 
 40 The Supreme Court’s characterization of consent decrees has varied.  Early cases emphat-
ically reject the characterization of consent decrees as contracts.  United States v. Swift & 
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932).  The Court later softened this position, stating that, be-
cause of their “dual character, consent decrees are treated as contracts for some purposes 
but not for others.”  United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236–37 n.10 
(1975); Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 
(1986) (holding that consent decrees are “hybrid[s]” that can be characterized as both 
contracts and judgments); see generally Thomas M. Mengler, Consent Decree Paradigms:  
Models Without Meaning, 29 B.C. L. REV. 891 (1988) (arguing that a consent decree cannot 
be treated either as a traditional contract or court order).  Judge Frank H. Easterbrook 
argues that a consent decree should be thought of as a contract, except for three main 
differences:  “the speed of enforcement, the court of enforcement, and the remedy for 
breach.  It is a contract all the same.  Its force comes from the parties’ agreement, not 
from the law that was the basis of the suit.”  Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 20. 
 41 Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 518. 
 42 See infra Section IV.A. 
 43 Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 529 (holding that an intervenor “does not have power to block 
the decree merely by withholding its consent”); accord Lawyer v. Dep’t of Justice, 521 U.S. 
567, 578–79 (1997). 
 44 Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 522; accord Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 20. 
 45 United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). 
 46 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 389 (1992); Armour & Co., 402 U.S. at 
682–83. 
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controversy.”47  A court also may order broader relief than the plain-
tiffs originally sought in the complaint, or than they could have ob-
tained following an adversarial trial.48 
In Local No. 93, International Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 
the Supreme Court established four requirements for a consent de-
cree to be approved.49  First, the court must have subject-matter juris-
diction of the underlying dispute.50  Second, the decree must “come 
within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings.”51  Third, 
the decree “must further the objectives of the law upon which the 
complaint was based.”52  Finally, the decree cannot affirmatively re-
quire “unlawful” action,53 although in constitutional challenges, 
courts sometimes will approve consent decrees that require or allow 
conduct that otherwise would be proscribed by the allegedly uncon-
stitutional legal provision.  A few circuits have held that it is an abuse 
of discretion for a district court to reject a consent decree that satis-
fies Local No. 93’s requirements.54 
As a practical matter, these standards do not substantially limit the 
range of consent decrees to which government defendants may 
agree.  Agencies and officials may consent to wide-ranging relief in 
cases in which they ultimately could have prevailed on either the facts 
or the law, or where the court may have awarded much narrower re-
lief.  A consent decree also may require government defendants to 
perform acts that are not otherwise legally mandated, thereby con-
straining the constitutionally and statutorily conferred discretion of 
executive officials and, perhaps more importantly, their successors.55  
 
 47 Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also Law-
yer, 521 U.S. at 579 n.6. 
 48 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389 (“[P]etitioners could settle the dispute . . . by undertaking to do 
more than the Constitution itself requires . . . [and] also more than what a court would 
have ordered absent the settlement.”). 
 49 Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 525. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 525–26. 
 54 See, e.g., Durrett v. Housing Auth. of Providence, 896 F.2d 600, 604 (1st Cir. 1990) (revers-
ing the district court for refusing to enter a consent decree that “would give plaintiffs far 
more comprehensive relief than they could have achieved with a victory after trial,” be-
cause it satisfied Local No. 93’s requirements). 
 55 See, e.g., Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 735 F.2d 1535, 1539 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing the va-
lidity of a consent decree containing terms which “far exceeded the relief available” un-
der the federal statutes at issue in the underlying case); cf. Nobels v. Sec. Fin. Corp. of 
Ga., 431 F. App’x 835, 843 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming a consent decree between private 
litigants that “grant[ed] a form of relief that a court could not have granted had it en-
tered a judgment on the merits”). 
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In effect, government defendants may use consent decrees to not on-
ly create new legal rights and obligations, but also do so outside the 
normal legislative and regulatory processes, and in a way that en-
trenches their decisions, largely immunizing them from reversal by 
later administrations. 
Many federal courts—though not the Supreme Court—have es-
tablished one narrow check on this power, holding that a govern-
ment defendant may not enter into a consent decree that ignores or 
invalidates a statute unless the court first concludes that the statute 
actually is unconstitutional or (for state laws) violates federal law.56  
Courts applying this principle also reject consent decrees that grant 
relief that the government defendant does not otherwise have the in-
dependent legal authority to offer.57  In Perkins v. City of Chicago 
Heights, for example, plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago Heights and 
the Chicago Heights Election Commission, alleging that the non-
partisan, at-large electoral system for city council violated § 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act.58  After the district court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
motion for summary judgment, the defendants and most of the plain-
tiffs entered into a consent decree which switched the city from a 
“[m]anagerial” form of government to a modified “[s]trong [m]ayor” 
system.59  The district court approved the decree because it found 
that the plaintiffs’ claims had “a significant basis in evidence and 
law.”60 
 
 56 Keith v. Volpe, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (vacating a consent decree enjoining 
the enforcement of a state billboard law because “the district court could not supersede 
California’s law unless it conflicts with any federal law”); see also PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 
705 F.3d 91, 116 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming the district court’s refusal to approve a consent 
decree barring enforcement of a state law restricting access to polling places because “the 
parties cannot circumvent valid state laws by way of a consent decree”); Nat’l Rev. Corp. v. 
Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 288 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that the judgment was void because the 
Attorney General had no authority to stipulate “that an act of the legislature is unconsti-
tutional”). 
 57 St. Charles Tower, Inc. v. Kurtz, 643 F.3d 264, 270 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that a gov-
ernment entity may agree to a consent decree that is inconsistent with state law only if 
that “remedy is necessary to rectify a violation of federal law”) (emphasis omitted); 
League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los Angeles, 498 F.3d 1052, 
1055 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A federal consent decree or settlement agreement cannot be a 
means for state officials to evade state law.”); Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs., 814 F.2d 
332, 342 (7th Cir. 1987) (“An alteration of the statutory scheme may not be based on 
consent alone; it depends on an exercise of federal power, which in turn depends on a 
violation of federal law.”); Martin v. Greenville, 369 N.E.2d 543, 546 (Ill. App. 1977) (“A 
municipality may not, under the guise of compromise, impair a public duty owed by it, 
and neither municipal officials nor the trial court may usurp the legislative process.”). 
 58 47 F.3d 212, 214 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 59 Id. at 215. 
 60 Id. at 217. 
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The non-consenting plaintiffs appealed the consent decree, and 
the Seventh Circuit vacated it.61  The court held that a consent decree 
may override state law only if “such a remedy is necessary to rectify a 
violation of federal law.”62  Because the Illinois Constitution stipulated 
that a municipality’s form of government may be changed only 
through a referendum, the defendants lacked authority to agree to 
such a change unless the existing system was illegal or unconstitu-
tional.63  The district court’s “generalized statements” about the plain-
tiffs’ claims did not “constitute sufficient findings of a violation of 
federal law” to warrant overriding state law and “direct[ing] changes 
normally requiring voter approval.”64 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, requiring an actual adjudication 
of illegality or unconstitutionality before allowing a consent decree to 
override state law, is the strictest.  The D.C. Circuit, in contrast, has 
held that a consent decree may override a statute if either the district 
court determines that the plaintiffs established the existence of a fed-
eral violation, or the government defendants admit such a violation.65  
Some courts have gone even further, holding that government de-
fendants may enter into consent decrees or other settlements declar-
ing legal provisions to be invalid so long as the plaintiffs’ claims are 
“substantial.”66 
One district court, for example, held, 
[T]he Attorney General may settle a case which arises from a good faith 
federal challenge to a state law without admitting that the law violates 
federal law.  As long as there is sufficient evidence to show that the chal-
lenge to the state law is reasonable, it is consistent with the Attorney 
General’s duties to allow him or her to determine that it is in the inter-
 
 61 Id. at 218. 
 62 Id. at 216. 
 63 Id. at 216–17 (citing ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(f)). 
 64 Id. at 217. 
 65 Cleveland Cnty. Ass’n for Gov’t By the People v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 
F.3d 468, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that state law cannot “stand in the way” of a con-
sent decree if the decree is remedying “an admitted or adjudged violation” of federal 
law). 
 66 DEG, LLC v. Township of Fairfield, 966 A.2d 1036, 1045 (N.J. 2009); see also Feeling v. 
Kelly, 152 F.R.D. 670, 672–73 (D.D.C. 1994) (reaffirming the propriety of a consent de-
cree construing a federal statute governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(“AFDC”) without assessing the validity of the plaintiffs’ allegations, based on considera-
tions of “judicial economy, convenience, as well as fairness to the litigants”); Summit Twp. 
Taxpayers Ass’n v. Summit Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 411 A.2d 1263, 1266 (Pa. Commw. 
1980) (upholding a court-approved settlement of a zoning case that effectively resulted in 
a variance, even though the statutory procedures for granting a variance were not satis-
fied). 
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ests of the state to save the expense of litigation by settling the controver-
sy.67 
Although its opinion is somewhat unclear, it appears that OLC’s 
position on consent decrees is closest to this last approach.  OLC be-
gins by acknowledging that “Congress may place limits on the scope 
of the Attorney General’s settlement power through the general laws 
that govern the conduct of the agencies on behalf of which the At-
torney General purports to settle.”68  It nevertheless goes on to con-
clude that the “‘Attorney General—in the exercise of his settlement 
responsibilities—is not bound by each and every statutory limitation 
and procedural requirement that Congress may have specifically im-
posed upon some other agency head in the administration of [the] 
agency’s programs.’”69  It further opines that a federal law which pro-
hibits an executive official, such as the Secretary of the Treasury, 
from settling certain types of claims does not apply to the Attorney 
General when representing that official in litigation.70  Thus, OLC be-
lieves that, at least in many circumstances, the Attorney General may 
enter into a consent decree on behalf of a government defendant re-
quiring conduct that the defendant otherwise could not legally per-
form. 
Despite the diversity of approaches to consent decrees that invali-
date or circumvent statutes, courts generally do not take precautions 
against consent decrees in which agencies agree to interpret, apply, 
or enforce statutes or other legal provisions in particular ways; prom-
ulgate particular regulations; or take other such actions.71 
Because a consent decree is a court order, the court has discretion 
to modify it based on “a significant change either in factual condi-
tions or in law,” even if one or more of the signatories objects.72  The 
 
 67 Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
 68 OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25. 
 69 Id. (quoting Settlement Authority of the United States in Oil Shale Cases, 4B Op. O.L.C. 
756, 758 (1980)). 
 70 Id. (citing Compromise of Claims Under Sections 3469 and 3229 of the Revised Statutes, 
38 Op. Att’y Gen. 94 (1933)). 
 71 See, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1579 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that, because the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services agreed to a consent decree which required “the 
promulgation of regulations, she cannot now object to th[ose] terms”); Citizens for a Bet-
ter Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1120–21 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming a consent decree 
requiring the EPA “to promulgate guidelines and limitations governing the discharge by 
21 industries of 65 specified pollutants” and “mandat[ing] the use of certain scientific 
methodologies and decision-making criteria”). 
 72 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992); cf. United States v. Swift & 
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) (holding that a district court may modify an antitrust con-
sent decree only upon a “clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen 
conditions”).  In the wake of Rufo, commentators have split on how broadly Rufo should 
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Supreme Court has held, however, that a party may not seek to modi-
fy a consent decree simply because subsequent rulings have clarified 
the law upon which the plaintiffs’ claims were based, or demonstrate 
those claims to be weaker than originally thought.73  It explained that 
granting courts broad discretion to modify consent decrees based on 
subsequent legal developments “would undermine the finality of such 
agreements and could serve as a disincentive to negotiation of settle-
ments.”74 
Even when subsequent developments make modification appro-
priate, the court must ensure that the change is “tailored to resolve 
the problems created by the change in circumstances,” rather than 
“rewrit[ing] [the] consent decree so that it conforms to the constitu-
tional floor.”75  When modifying a decree, a court may not review 
whether certain provisions “‘could have been opposed with success if 
the defendants had offered opposition.’”76  Thus, government de-
fendants may not readily change consent decrees as new administra-
tions, which may interpret the law differently, take office. 
B.  Other Means of Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication 
Consent decrees are only one procedural vehicle through which 
litigants, including government defendants, may seek judicial rulings 
that affirm or alter their respective legal rights and obligations with-
out having the court fully consider the merits of the underlying is-
 
be interpreted, and whether its more liberal modification standard should be applied be-
yond the context of institutional consent decrees, particularly to antitrust decrees.  See, 
e.g., John D. Anderson, Note, Modifications of Antitrust Consent Decrees:  Over a Double Barrel, 
84 MICH. L. REV. 134, 153–54 (1985) (arguing that courts should apply a sliding scale to 
requested modifications of antitrust consent decrees, depending on which party is seek-
ing the modification and whether it is opposed); Jed Goldfarb, Note, Keeping Rufo in Its 
Cell:  The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County 
Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625, 629 (1997) (arguing that applying the flexible Rufo standard to 
antitrust consent decrees would “reduce settlement incentives for antitrust enforcement 
agencies”); David S. Konczal, Note, Ruing Rufo:  Ramifications of a Lenient Standard for 
Modifying Antitrust Consent Decrees, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 130, 134 (1996) (arguing that 
the standard for modifying antitrust consent decrees should be stricter than Rufo but of-
fer more “flexibility” than Swift). 
 73 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389–90; see, e.g., Feeling v. Kelly, 152 F.R.D. 670, 672–73 (D.D.C. 1994) 
(declining to vacate a consent decree, despite a subsequent Supreme Court case that ar-
guably weakened some of the plaintiffs’ claims, due to “paramount issues of judicial 
economy, convenience, as well as fairness to the litigants”). 
 74 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 389. 
75  Id. at 391. 
 76 Id. at 391–92 (quoting Swift, 286 U.S. at 116–17). 
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sues.77  Litigants also may use defaults, failure to oppose dispositive 
motions, stipulations of law, waivers and forfeitures, and confessions 
of error to attempt to obtain a substantive judgment while avoiding 
adversarial adjudication of a case, or particular issues within a case.78  
This Section demonstrates that, for a variety of doctrinal and practi-
cal reasons, consent decrees are more problematic than such other 
procedural vehicles, giving governmental defendants greater leeway 
to effectively change the law, entrench their policy preferences, and 
restrict their successors’ discretion based on potentially faulty legal 
premises that courts do not review in-depth. 
Most basically, a defendant implicitly may accede to a plaintiff’s 
claims by failing to file a responsive pleading to a complaint.  A court 
typically will treat such a failure as a default79 and deem the com-
plaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations admitted.80  Even in such cas-
es, however, the court is required to assess the validity of the com-
plaint’s allegations of law81 and determine whether the plaintiff has 
stated valid causes of action.82  Likewise, if the plaintiff seeks an in-
junction, then the court must exercise its equitable discretion and 
decide for itself whether the requested relief is appropriate.83 
 
 77 For a more detailed discussion of the various ways in which litigants can attempt to obtain 
substantive court rulings while avoiding adversarial adjudication of cases, or particular is-
sues within cases, see Michael T. Morley, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication and the Limits of 
Article III, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2014). 
 78 Settlement agreements are not included in this list because, as discussed at greater length 
later, see infra Section IV.A, they are private contracts.  Generally, a court’s only responsi-
bility when parties enter into a settlement agreement is to dismiss the case, which the Su-
preme Court has recognized is a purely administrative housekeeping matter.  U.S. Ban-
corp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1994). 
 79 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(a). 
 80 Id. R. 8(b)(6); see also City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom’ that a defendant who defaults thereby 
admits all ‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations contained in the complaint.” (citation omit-
ted)); cf. Angelo Iafrate Constr., LLC v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 370 F.3d 715, 722 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (“A default judgment entered by the court binds the party facing the default as 
having admitted all of the well pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint.”). 
 81 Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[A] 
defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of 
law.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 82 Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that, even if a defendant is 
in default, a court is “required to determine whether the [plaintiff’s] allegations establish 
[the defendant’s] liability as a matter of law”); DirecTV, Inc. v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 
855 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s “refus[al] to grant default judgment” 
because the “complaints failed to state violations” of federal law). 
 83 13 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.03 (3d ed. 1997) (“[A] plaintiff is not entitled to a 
permanent injunction simply because a default judgment has been entered; the court 
must engage in an ‘inquiry’ to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that in-
junctive relief is appropriate.”); see also Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885) 
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When a federal agency or official defaults, the burdens on the 
plaintiff are even higher.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(d) pro-
vides, “A default judgment may be entered against the United States, 
its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or 
right to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.”84  Although “the 
quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a court can be less 
than that normally required,”85 the plaintiff still must make an eviden-
tiary showing, in addition to establishing the legal validity of its claims 
and sufficiency of its allegations.  Courts apply Rule 55(d) vigorously; 
a court will not enter a default judgment against the Government un-
less it believes that the plaintiff is entitled to relief on the merits.86 
Alternatively, a defendant may attempt to implicitly agree to a 
plaintiff’s claims by failing to oppose a motion for summary judg-
ment.  Typically, when a litigant does not oppose a motion, the court 
deems the matter conceded.87  Summary judgment, however, “cannot 
be granted by default even if there is a complete failure to respond to 
the motion.”88  Rather, the court must confirm that the moving par-
ty’s legal arguments are valid and that the record contains no dis-
putes of material fact.89  Thus, courts apply stricter standards when 
awarding relief as a result of a default or failure to oppose a disposi-
tive motion than when considering a proposed consent decree. 
 
(“[A] decree pro confesso is not a decree as of course according to the prayer of the 
bill . . . [but] is made (or should be made) by the court, according to what is proper to be 
decreed upon the statements of the bill assumed to be true.”). 
 84 FED. R. CIV. P. 55(d). 
 85 Alameda v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 622 F.2d 1044, 1048 (1st Cir. 1980). 
 86 See, e.g., Harvey v. United States, 685 F.3d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that, be-
cause the plaintiff “did not provide satisfactory expert evidence to establish his claims, he 
is not entitled to default judgment”); Camacho-Rodriguez v. Potter, 136 F. App’x 378, 379 
(1st Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (affirming judgment for the United States Postmaster Gen-
eral, despite his default, because the plaintiffs failed to establish an Americans with Disa-
bilities Act violation); Marziliano v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming 
the entry of default against the Secretary of Health and Human Services after confirming 
that “there was an adequate factual basis for [the plaintiff’s] claim”). 
 87 See, e.g., Hershey v. United States, No. 89-15262, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10366, at *6 (9th 
Cir. May 16, 1991) (“[F]ailure to file an opposition [i]s required to be treated 
as . . . consent to the granting of the motion.”). 
 88 FED. R. CIV. P. 56 Adv. Comm. Note (2010 Amend.); see, e.g., United States v. One Piece of 
Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101–02 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(“[T]he district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that 
the motion was unopposed but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.”). 
 89 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(3) (providing that, if a party “fails to properly address another 
party’s assertion of fact” in response to a summary judgment motion, the court may 
“grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials . . . show that the mo-
vant is entitled to it” (emphasis added)). 
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Litigants also may use stipulations of law to attempt to resolve is-
sues in a case without having the court pass on their merits.  The Su-
preme Court has declined to address whether courts have a “duty” to 
consider the merits of stipulations of law before accepting them, and 
has instead held only that courts have discretion to do so.90  It is un-
clear how courts are to apply this standard. 
Typically, a court “abuses its discretion when it makes an error of 
law.”91  If this meant that accepting an erroneous stipulation of law 
constituted an abuse of discretion, then a court would have to review 
and assess the validity of all such stipulations, and there would be lit-
tle, if any, room for any actual exercise of discretion.  Because the 
Supreme Court expressly declined to require courts to review stipula-
tions of law, however,92 it is unclear whether or when a court must 
identify and reject invalid stipulations. 
Although stipulations of law warrant further academic considera-
tion,93 they are less concerning than consent decrees for two reasons.  
First, as a practical matter, government litigants are far more likely to 
attempt to resolve major or dispositive legal issues through consent 
decrees (or settlement agreements) rather than stipulations, in order 
to avoid potentially unpredictable or undesirable remedial conse-
quences.  A government litigant has a strong incentive to offer major 
stipulations only in the context of an overall resolution of a case, to 
be able to influence the nature and scope of the resulting relief. 
Second, whereas courts are extremely limited in the degree of 
scrutiny they may apply to proposed consent decrees,94 they (at a min-
imum) have complete discretion to delve into the merits of a pro-
posed stipulation of law.95  Thus, current doctrine gives courts greater 
flexibility to refuse erroneous stipulations of law than consent decrees 
based on incorrect legal premises. 
Rather than offering an express stipulation of law, litigants may at-
tempt to preclude comprehension and accurate judicial considera-
tion of the underlying issues in a case by forfeiting or waiving issues 
or arguments.  A forfeiture occurs when a party “fail[s] to make time-
 
 90 U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993). 
 91 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996). 
 92 Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. at 448 (“We need not decide whether the Court of Appeals 
had, as it concluded, a ‘duty’ to address” the validity of litigants’ stipulations of law). 
 93 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1218–24 (2011) (ex-
plaining how competing conceptions of the judiciary’s main function have different im-
plications for how courts should consider stipulations of law); Morley, supra note 77. 
 94 Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) 
(establishing a liberal four-prong test for approving consent decrees); see supra Part I. 
 95 Indep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. at 448. 
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ly assertion of [a] right” before the court,96 while a waiver occurs 
when a litigant “intentional[ly] relinquish[es] or abandon[s]” a 
claim, argument, or right.97 
A waiver or forfeiture is akin to an implicit or unintentional stipu-
lation of law.  As with stipulations of law, courts are not required to 
reach the merits of waived or forfeited arguments or issues, but have 
discretion to do so.  Sometimes, this authority is described as com-
pletely discretionary,98 while other cases hold that courts may adjudi-
cate such issues only when “necessary to avoid a manifest injustice.”99  
A government defendant seeking to concede a plaintiff’s claims with-
out judicial consideration of them is likely to rely on a consent de-
cree, rather than just waiving or forfeiting a potentially meritorious 
argument, because a consent decree allows greater control over the 
ultimate outcome of the case and the relief the court awards. 
Finally, litigants may use a confession of error to attempt to in-
duce a court to base a ruling on their undisputed conception of the 
law.  A confession of error acknowledges that an appellate court 
should reverse or vacate a lower court’s opinion due to a defect or er-
ror and typically remand for further proceedings.100  In Lawrence v. 
Chater,101 the Court explained that it does not “determin[e] the[] 
merits” of a confession of error, but rather considers only whether 
the confession is “plausible.”102  Under this extremely liberal standard, 
when the Solicitor General confesses error, the Court almost invaria-
bly “GVRs” the case:  grants certiorari, vacates the lower court ruling, 
 
 96 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (2009). 
 97 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993). 
 98 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (“The matter of what questions may be taken 
up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the 
courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.”); Freeman v. Pitts-
burgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[I]t is within our discretion 
to consider an issue that the parties did not raise below.”). 
 99 In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2008). 
100 Solicitor General Drew S. Days, III, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 
SMU L. REV. 73, 78 (1995) (“Solicitors General have ‘confessed error’ in cases where the 
government has won in the lower courts but the Solicitor General concluded that a ‘fun-
damental error’ had led to that result.”). 
101 516 U.S. 163, 170–71 (1996). 
102 Id.; see also Nunez v. United States, 554 U.S. 911, 912 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing the Court’s “dubious yet well-entrenched habit of entering a GVR order without 
an independent examination of the merits when the Government, as respondent, confesses er-
ror in the judgment below” (alteration in original)); Mariscal v. United States, 449 U.S. 
405, 407 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“But I harbor serious doubt that our adver-
sary system of justice is well served by this Court’s practice of routinely vacating judgments 
which the Solicitor General questions without any independent examination of the mer-
its on our own.”). 
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and remands for reconsideration in light of the Government’s new 
position.103 
The Court’s current approach of almost reflexively approving 
them exacerbates the potential problems.104  Because confessions of 
error are made at the appellate level, after a government litigant al-
ready has obtained a favorable judgment below, however, they tend 
to be quite rare.  Moreover, as with stipulations of law, government 
litigants have a strong incentive to try to settle a case outright 
through a consent decree or settlement agreement, rather than con-
ceding an important or dispositive issue without trying to contain the 
resulting fallout. 
Thus, for both doctrinal and practical reasons, consent decrees 
are a particularly problematic method through which government 
defendants may obtain substantive court orders without merits-based 
rulings on the underlying legal issues,105 thereby potentially circum-
venting the traditional legislative and regulatory processes.  Neverthe-
less, to the extent that concerns about consent decrees also apply to 
other procedural vehicles such as stipulations of law; waivers and for-
feitures; and confessions of error, some of the reforms suggested in 
Part IV may be extended to them, as well. 
II.  CONSENT DECREES, ADVERSENESS, AND JUSTICIABILITY 
An unavoidable, yet typically overlooked, threshold issue regard-
ing consent decrees is whether a court has Article III jurisdiction to 
enter them.106  When litigants reach an understanding and are ready 
 
103 See Nunez, 554 U.S. at 912 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Mariscal, 449 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
104 As explained at greater length in Morley, supra note 77, the Court has not always held 
such a permissive attitude toward confessions of error.  From 1942 through the 1970s, the 
Court “examine[d] independently the errors confessed” rather than leaving the devel-
opment of the law “to the stipulation of the parties.”  Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 
257, 258–59 (1942). 
105 One additional unofficial alternative is that the Executive could purport to defend a case, 
but deliberately do a poor job.  See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 119–20 (2000); see also Brianne J. Gorod, Defending Execu-
tive Nondefense and the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1207–08 (2012) 
(recognizing that, when “the purported proponent of [a] statute does not actually believe 
that it is constitutional,” it may be “unwilling to make the strongest arguments in support 
of its constitutionality”, it undermines that system and the benefits it is supposed to pro-
mote.”).  Professor Daniel J. Meltzer downplays this risk based on “the traditions of the 
career lawyers in the Department [of Justice].”  Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Con-
gressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1225 (2011). 
106 One issue beyond the scope of this Article is the extent to which this analysis differs with 
regard to Article I courts. 
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to terminate a case on mutually agreeable terms, it is questionable 
whether a live “case or controversy” continues to exist or that the par-
ties’ posture remains sufficiently adversarial for the dispute to be 
deemed justiciable.  Litigants who submit a proposed consent decree 
to a court are signaling that they no longer want or need the court to 
adjudicate any disputed questions of facts or law and that they are in 
accord regarding their respective legal rights and obligations.  This is 
most apparent in the extreme case, where a plaintiff files a complaint 
and a proposed consent decree simultaneously.107 
Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement108 allows federal 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over only “actual” disputes “arising be-
tween adverse litigants.”109  In theory, federal courts “refus[e] to en-
tertain cases” which do not involve “a collision of actively asserted and 
differing claims”110 or “the honest and actual antagonistic assertion of 
rights.”111  The Court has explained, “[T]he adjudicatory process is 
most securely founded when it is exercised under the impact of a live-
ly conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed, which 
make resolution of the controverted issue a practical necessity.”112 
A case which begins as a justiciable dispute later may become non-
justiciable if the parties are no longer adversarial or antagonistic to-
ward each other113 or their dispute is otherwise mooted.114   
 
107 This objection applies to all consent decrees, not just those in government-defendant 
cases, but it has particular salience to the latter.  Private litigants usually can memorialize 
the terms of a consent decree in a settlement agreement instead, and even may agree to 
have the court in which the underlying case was filed adjudicate any alleged violations of 
the agreement.  Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1994).  
The main difference between a settlement agreement and a consent decree in such cases 
is the availability of the contempt remedy.  Government defendants, in contrast, often 
cannot achieve the same substantive outcomes in a settlement agreement as they could in 
a consent decree.  Thus, the practical ramifications of allowing courts to enter consent 
decrees in government-defendant cases are far greater than in other types of disputes.  See 
infra Part III.   
108 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (specifying that the federal “judicial power shall extend” to 
various types of “cases” and “controversies”); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). 
109 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911). 
110 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961). 
111 United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943); accord Chi. & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. 
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1892). 
112 Poe, 367 U.S. at 503.  In the extreme case, Article III’s adverseness requirement bars fed-
eral courts from entertaining lawsuits where the real party in interest is the same on both 
sides.  S. Spring Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300, 301 
(1892); Wood-Paper Co. v. Heft, 75 U.S. 333, 336 (1869).  It likewise bars jurisdiction 
where the parties falsely stipulate to, or avoid litigating the existence of, key facts in order 
to generate a test case so that a legal or constitutional issue may be resolved.  Bartemeyer 
v. Iowa, 85 U.S. 129, 135 (1873). 
113 See, e.g., S. Spring Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. at 301 (holding that the case had become non-
justiciable because, while it was pending, the same people came to control the corpora-
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The majority opinion in United States v. Windsor, in which the 
Court invalidated § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),115 
largely treated Article III’s adverseness requirement as a prudential, 
rather than jurisdictional, limitation.116  The plaintiff in Windsor sued 
to obtain a tax refund that the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) had 
denied her because § 3 prevented the Court from recognizing her 
same-sex marriage.117  Although the Obama Administration required 
federal agencies to enforce § 3’s definition of marriage as a union be-
tween one man and one woman,118 it prohibited DOJ from defending 
the provision’s constitutionality in court.119 
The Supreme Court commented that the DOJ’s failure to contest 
the plaintiff’s constitutional arguments raised “prudential” concerns 
because the litigants’ agreement on the main issue in the case could 
lead to a “friendly, non-adversary proceeding.”120  The Court held that 
those concerns were overcome, however, because the U.S. House of 
Representative’s Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group had intervened to 
defend § 3’s constitutionality.121  It also expressed concern that declin-
ing to hear the case would lead to a substantial amount of unneces-
sary litigation in the lower courts.122  Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by 
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, vigorously 
dissented, arguing that Article III’s adverseness requirement was ju-
risdictional.123 
 Notwithstanding Windsor, it is likely that Article III’s adverseness 
requirement remains at least partly jurisdictional.  The majority opin-
ion held that a justiciable case existed, despite the Government’s 
 
tions on both sides); Wood-Paper Co., 75 U.S. at 336 (holding that the case had become 
non-justiciable because, while it was pending, the plaintiffs purchased the patents at issue 
and therefore “own[ed] both sides of the subject-matter of [the] litigation”). 
114 See, e.g., Singer Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 141 U.S. 696, 700 (1891) (“The taxes being paid, the 
further prosecution of this suit to enjoin their collection would present only a moot ques-
tion, upon which we have neither the right nor the inclination to express an opinion.”); 
San Mateo Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138, 141 (1885) (deeming the case moot be-
cause “the debt for which the suit was brought has been unconditionally paid and satis-
fied”). 
115  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 
(1996)), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
116  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683–89. 
117  Id. at 2683.   
118  1 U.S.C. § 7.  
119  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683–84.  
120  Id. at 2687 (internal quotation omitted). 
121  Id. at 2687–88.  
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Article III requires not just a plaintiff (or appellant) 
who has standing to complain but an opposing party who denies the validity of the com-
plaint.” (emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 2711–12 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
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agreement with the plaintiff’s constitutional arguments, because the 
IRS refused to “give . . . effect” to those arguments through its con-
tinued refusal to provide the tax refund that the plaintiff claimed.124  
Thus, even though the majority opinion frames the jurisdictional is-
sue in terms of standing, it seems to suggest that the parties must be 
at least minimally adverse to each other—even if only with regard to 
the plaintiff’s ultimate relief—for a federal court to be able to exer-
cise jurisdiction over a matter.125 
 It also is noteworthy that Windsor did not purport to overrule any 
of the precedents discussed in this Part that more squarely frame Ar-
ticle III’s adverseness requirement as a jurisdictional issue,126 suggest-
ing the continued validity of those holdings.  Finally, the majority 
opinion itself stressed the “unusual and urgent” nature of the case.127  
Especially given the politically charged nature of the dispute, the 
fundamental rights at stake, and the tremendous public pressure and 
attention it generated, the case might not offer the best view of the 
Court’s attitude toward the adverseness issue.  Even if adverseness ul-
timately is viewed as a prudential limitation rather than an absolute 
jurisdictional requirement, however, it remains rooted in Article III, 
and federal courts generally must decline to entertain cases where 
the parties are not adverse to each other.128   
Consent decrees raise—or, perhaps more accurately, should 
raise—justiciability concerns because a justiciable case cannot exist 
where both sides come to “desire the same result.”129  Section A delves 
into the serious challenges that consent decrees present under Arti-
cle III’s adverseness requirement.  Section B explains why the func-
tional considerations underlying that requirement do not support the 
issuance of consent decrees, either.  Section C shows that the Su-
preme Court’s attempts to reconcile consent decrees with Article III 
are unpersuasive.  Section D distinguishes other judicial practices in 
which the participants also lack adverseness that commonly are said 
to provide a basis for allowing courts to enter consent decrees.  Final-
 
124  Id. at 2685.  
125  Id.  
126  See supra notes 108–13; infra note 159.  
127  Id. at 2688.   
128  Id. at 2687 (“Even when Article III permits the exercise of federal jurisdiction, prudential 
considerations demand that the Court insist upon ‘that concrete adverseness which 
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumina-
tion of difficult constitutional questions.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962))).  
129 Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 47, 48 (1971) (per curiam) (dis-
missing an appeal because both parties were seeking the same declaratory judgment). 
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ly, Section E briefly examines other arguments commentators have 
offered to defend the use of consent decrees by Article III courts. 
A.  Consent Decrees and Article III Precedent 
Although the Supreme Court consistently has held that Article III 
permits federal courts to issue consent decrees,130 several of its prece-
dents suggest that they raise serious justiciability concerns.  In Lord v. 
Veazie, for example, the Court dismissed the appeal because there was 
“no real dispute” between the litigants and their interests “were not 
adverse.”131  It explained, “It is the office of courts of justice to decide 
the rights of persons and of property, when the persons interested cannot 
adjust them by agreement between themselves—and to do this upon the full 
hearing of both parties.”132  It concluded that a ruling entered in the 
absence of adverseness between the parties “in the eye of the law is no 
judgment of the court.  It is a nullity . . . .”133  When litigants have 
reached the point where they are able to seek a consent decree, by 
definition, they can determine their rights “by agreement between 
themselves,”134 and one of the key conditions of justiciability identi-
fied in Lord is lacking. 
Likewise, in Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the 
Court reiterated that a case is not justiciable when both sides seek the 
same relief.135  The district court there had held that a provision of 
North Carolina’s anti-busing law was unconstitutional and enjoined 
its enforcement.  On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, both parties 
argued that the lower court had erred and that the statute was consti-
tutional.  The Court observed, “We are thus confronted with the 
anomaly that both litigants desire precisely the same result, namely a 
holding that the anti-busing statute is constitutional.  There is, there-
fore, no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the 
Constitution.”136  These holdings raise serious questions about the 
permissibility of entering a judgment when both sides argue in favor 
of it. 
 
130 See infra Section II.C. 
131 49 U.S. 251, 254 (1850). 
132 Id. at 255 (emphasis added). 
133 Id. at 256. 
134 Id. at 255. 
135 402 U.S. 47, 47 (1971). 
136 Id. at 47–48; see also Chi. & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 346 (1892) 
(holding that a court should not “declare legislative acts unconstitutional upon agreed 
and general statements” from the parties). 
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The Court also alluded to justiciability concerns regarding con-
sent decrees in Vermont v. New York, an original jurisdiction case aris-
ing from an interstate water dispute.137  After litigating for over two 
months about a polluted sludge bed in Lake Champlain and Ticon-
deroga Creek, the State litigants agreed to resolve the case by enter-
ing into a consent decree.138  The proposed decree stated that “no 
findings” would be made, and it “shall not constitute an adjudication 
on any issue of fact or law, or evidence, or [an] admission by any par-
ty with respect to any such issue.”139  It called for immediate action to 
remediate the pollution, as well as the appointment of a special 
“South Lake Master” to adjudicate any future disputes that arose con-
cerning it.140 
The Court decided “not to approve the Proposed Decree.”141  It 
observed, “In the instant case no findings of fact have been made; nor 
has any ruling been resolved concerning either equitable apportion-
ment of the water involved or the questions relative to whether New 
York . . . [is] responsible for the creation of a public nuisance as al-
leged by Vermont.”142  The Court further held, “Article III speaks of 
the ‘judicial power’ of this Court, which embraces application of 
principles of law or equity to facts, distilled by hearings or by stipula-
tions.  Nothing in the Proposed Decree . . . speaks in terms of ‘judi-
cial power.’”143  The Court went on to suggest that it would be more 
appropriate for the parties to settle the dispute through either an in-
terstate compact or a traditional settlement agreement.144 
Three Justices came closest to questioning the validity of consent 
decrees in Maryland v. United States, in which several States intervened 
in an antitrust enforcement action to challenge a consent decree be-
tween AT&T and DOJ.145  The States argued that the decree improp-
erly preempted their laws regulating the telephone industry.146  The 
Court summarily affirmed the decree, but then-Justice William 
Rehnquist, dissenting along with Chief Justice Warren Berger and 
 
137 417 U.S. 270 (1974). 
138 Id. at 270–71. 
139 Id. at 271. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 274. 
142 Id. at 276.  The Court also expressed concern that, in reviewing the recommendations of 
the Special Master and “supervising the execution of the Consent Decree,” it “would be 
acting more in an arbitral rather than a judicial manner.”  Id. at 277. 
143 Id. at 277. 
144 Id. at 277–78. 
145 460 U.S. 1001, 1002 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
146 Id. at 1102 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Byron White, wrote, “I am troubled by the notion that a dis-
trict court, by entering what is in essence a private agreement be-
tween parties to a lawsuit, invokes the Supremacy Clause powers of 
the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulatory laws.”147  Such 
concerns over the invalidation of state laws based solely on a consent 
decree logically would extend to invalidation, or even definitive in-
terpretation, of federal laws and regulations pursuant to the Gov-
ernment’s agreement with a private party, as well. 
Professors Martin Redish and Andrianna Kastanek raised similar 
justiciability-related objections to settlement class actions in the Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review a few years ago: 
[B]ecause by its nature [a settlement class action suit] does not involve 
any live dispute between the parties that a federal court is being asked to 
resolve through litigation, and because from the outset of the proceeding 
the parties are in full accord as to how the claims should be disposed of, 
there is missing the adverseness between the parties that is a central ele-
ment of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.148 
Thus, Article III’s adverseness requirement presents a serious and 
largely under-appreciated challenge to federal court approval of con-
sent decrees.149  Unlike a mere stipulation of law150 or confession of 
error,151 a consent decree purports to formally dispose of an entire 
case.  If parties wish to voluntarily terminate litigation on mutually 
agreeable terms, then they may do so through a settlement agree-
ment accompanied by voluntary dismissal, rather than a consent de-
cree. 
A settlement agreement does not raise Article III concerns be-
cause it is a private contract, and an unadorned dismissal is an ap-
 
147 Id.  (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
148 Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy 
Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547 (2006); see 
also Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273, 1278 (2009) (arguing 
that a court’s review of a proposed class action settlement “is often made without the 
benefit of a truly adversarial process—the parties who control the litigation have already 
reached agreement”). 
149 Cf. Fiss, supra note 148, at 1278 (stating briefly that it is “impermissible for judges to ap-
prove settlements and lend their authority to them as when a consent decree is entered” 
because the court would be ruling “without the benefit of a truly adversarial process”); 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual Functions of the 
Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 526 (1994) (stating in passing that there is “no 
live controversy between adverse parties” when they seek a consent decree); William B. 
Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 413 (2001) (arguing 
that “judicial activity fits oddly into the adversarial framework” when “[t]he parties are no 
longer adverse to one other, but rather in accord on the settlement terms”). 
150 U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 448 (1993). 
151 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 170–71 (1996). 
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propriate means of terminating a case that no longer presents a justi-
ciable controversy.152  As discussed later,153 because settlement agree-
ments are simply contracts, government officials and agencies cannot 
use them to circumvent constitutional or statutory limits on their au-
thority or restrict their successors’ discretion in interpreting laws, 
promulgating regulations, or enforcing legal requirements.154  Thus, 
while settlement agreements always are more appropriate than con-
sent decrees from an Article III perspective, the distinction is espe-
cially important in government-defendant cases.155 
B.  Functional Analysis of Adverseness 
Consent decrees also are problematic when considered in light of 
the functional considerations underlying Article III’s adverseness re-
quirement.  First, requiring adverseness between the parties improves 
the quality of judicial decision-making.156  Litigants with competing 
interests and goals typically offer different perspectives on a case and 
have a strong incentive to provide the court with all pertinent facts 
and law.  Courts are more likely to reach the correct answer when 
parties actively identify the flaws or omissions in each other’s argu-
ments.  Conversely, when all litigants desire the same result, they have 
little incentive to highlight defects in their arguments or present ad-
verse considerations persuasively, beyond the bare minimum re-
quired by the rules of ethics.157 
Adverseness also promotes judicial economy, by ensuring that 
courts’ limited resources are dedicated to parties that actually require 
judicial intervention to resolve their disputes and determine their re-
spective rights and obligations.  Litigants that have reached an under-
standing are free to memorialize it in a settlement agreement and 
need not call upon a court to issue a consent decree.  Although plain-
tiffs might prefer a consent decree so that they can enforce their 
 
152 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1994). 
153 See infra Section IV.A. 
154 See United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 888–89, 896 (1996) (plurality opinion) (reaf-
firming the continued validity of the reserved powers doctrine and sovereign acts doc-
trine as limits on the ability of government entities to enter into contracts limiting the ex-
ercise of their sovereign authority); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1879) 
(“[A]gencies can govern according to their discretion . . . while in power; but they cannot 
give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them . . . .”). 
155 See also infra Part III. 
156 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503 (1961) (“[T]he adjudicatory process is most securely 
founded when it is exercised under the impact of a lively conflict between antagonistic 
demands, actively pressed . . . .”). 
157 Giradeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 585, 650 (1983). 
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rights through summary contempt proceedings rather than being 
relegated to a breach of contract claim, that difference in remedy 
does not render a settlement agreement an inadequate alternative.158 
A third justification for Article III’s adverseness requirement is to 
help ensure that courts do not stray beyond their constitutional role 
by performing functions entrusted to the legislative or executive 
branches.159  Many consent decrees in non-institutional public law 
cases require courts to invalidate or adopt a definitive interpretation 
of a legal provision, potentially without even considering the merits 
of the matter.160  Alternatively, they can require executive branch offi-
cials to apply or enforce legal provisions in a certain manner, thereby 
restricting the future exercise of their discretion, even if the court or 
successor administrations would have interpreted those provisions 
differently.161  While courts may nullify the actions or restrict the dis-
cretion of governmental entities when necessary to ensure compli-
ance with constitutional or statutory requirements,162 doing so based 
purely on the litigants’ consent is unwarranted judicial interference 
with those entities’ institutional prerogatives. 
Finally, adverseness reduces the likelihood that litigants will use 
the judicial system to obtain a ruling that will prejudice third par-
ties.163  This is most evident in the context of government-defendant 
cases.  When government defendants use consent decrees to override 
laws or regulations, or bind the discretion of successor administra-
tions and officials, those decrees prejudice not only the government 
defendants’ successors, but also the voters who directly or indirectly 
 
158 As discussed in Section IV.A, the use of settlement agreements rather than consent de-
crees would have the biggest impact in government-defendant cases.  Contracts in which 
an agency or official purports to limit or waive its statutory authority to promulgate or en-
force regulations generally are unenforceable, particularly through specific performance.  
The fact that settlement agreements are more limited than consent decrees in that re-
spect is not a deficiency, however, but rather a substantial reason for favoring them.  See 
infra Part IV. 
159 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (noting that Article III “limit[s] the business of 
federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically 
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process”). 
160 See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) 
(establishing a four-factor test for approving consent decrees); Cleveland Cnty. Ass’n for 
Gov’t By the People v. Cleveland Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 468, 477 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (holding that a consent decree may override a state law to rectify either “an admit-
ted or adjudged violation” of federal law); DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 966 A.2d 1036, 
1045–46 (N.J. 2009) (holding that a state Attorney General may settle a case involving a 
constitutional challenge to a state law to avoid an adjudication on the merits). 
161 See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
162 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1971). 
163 Redish & Kastanek, supra note 148, at 549. 
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put them in office, many of whom may not have legal standing to 
challenge the decree.  Thus, consent decrees—particularly in gov-
ernment-defendant cases—are inconsistent with the purposes under-
lying Article III’s adverseness requirement. 
C.  Judicial Attempts to Reconcile Consent Decrees with Article III 
Although a few district courts occasionally have refused to enter 
consent decrees due to lack of adverseness,164 the Supreme Court 
consistently has approved their use, without persuasively explaining 
their constitutional foundation.  Most commentators cite Swift & Co. 
v. United States165 or Pope v. United States166 to establish that it has “long 
been settled” that “a consent decree, in which a public administrative 
agency presents for judicial approval a prenegotiated settle-
ment . . . in order to provide prospective relief . . . constitutes a ‘case 
or controversy’ sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction under 
Article III.”167  Neither of these cases, however, resolves the justiciabil-
ity issue. 
In Swift, meatpacking companies that had agreed to an antitrust 
consent decree several years earlier asked the Court to vacate it.168  
They argued that the district court had lacked jurisdiction under Ar-
ticle III to enter the decree in the first instance because the fact that 
all parties to the suit had sought such relief indicated that the “con-
troversy had ceased.”169  The Court rejected the claim, holding that a 
party to a consent decree may not later collaterally attack it based on 
lack of jurisdiction.170  The Court explained that, if the district court 
 
164 See, e.g., Idaho Bus. Holdings, LLC v. City of Tempe, No. CV-06-2137-PHX-FJM, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 62352, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2007) (holding that, where “the parties pur-
port to have settled their case and thus there is no longer a case within the meaning of 
Article III,” it would not “be appropriate” to enter a consent decree “adjudicat[ing] a 
constitutional question”); Hazel B. v. Otis, Civ. Action File No. 6820, 1974 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12024, at *6 (D. Vt. Mar. 2, 1974) (declining to issue a consent decree because 
“[t]he courts are without judicial power to dispose of constitutional issues where proceed-
ings are not clearly adversary or in which there is no actual antagonistic assertion of 
rights, even if undertaken in good faith”); Macklin v. Kaiser Co., 69 F. Supp. 137, 141 (D. 
Or. 1946) (“As a result of [the] absence of controversy, the stipulation of settlement ren-
ders the case moot.  The court is not then bound to enter judgment to enforce the stipu-
lation of settlement made by the parties.”). 
165 276 U.S. 311, 313–15 (1928). 
166 323 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1944). 
167 E.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 928 
n.115 (1996); Randolph D. Moss, Note, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegre-
gation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE L.J. 1811, 1819 n.47 (1986). 
168  276 U.S. 311, 321 (1928). 
169 Id. at 326. 
170 Id. at 311–12. 
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that issued the decree had “erred in deciding that there was a case or 
controversy, the error is one which could have been corrected only by 
an appeal.”171 
Thus, the Swift Court dodged the issue of whether the pendency 
of a proposed consent decree causes a case to lose its adversarial na-
ture.  Nevertheless, Swift customarily is cited as recognizing that con-
sent decrees are consistent with Article III172 because the Court also 
stated, in somewhat cryptic dicta, that the defendants’ argument “ig-
nores the fact that a suit for an injunction deals primarily, not with 
past violations, but with threatened future ones; and that an injunc-
tion may issue to prevent future wrong, although no right has yet 
been violated.”173  Although these observations are accurate, they do 
not address whether parties seeking a consent decree stand in a suffi-
ciently adversarial relationship to allow a court to entertain and grant 
their request for injunctive relief. 
In Pope—which did not even involve a consent decree—Congress 
had passed a special law allowing a particular contractor to sue in the 
Court of Claims to be reimbursed for expenses he had incurred while 
building a tunnel for the District of Columbia’s water system.174  The 
Court of Claims held that the law was unconstitutional, because it ef-
fectively gave the plaintiff a right to judgment and “decid[ed] all 
questions of fact except certain simple computations.”175  The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding among other things, “When a plaintiff 
brings suit to enforce a legal obligation[,] it is not any the less a case 
or controversy upon which a court possessing the federal judicial 
power may rightly give judgment, because the plaintiff’s claim is un-
contested or incontestable.”176  The Court declared, “It is a judicial 
function and an exercise of the judicial power to render judgment on 
consent.  A judgment upon consent is a ‘judicial act.’”177 
The Court’s holding may not be as broad as it initially appears.  
The Court cited Swift which, as discussed above, addressed the justici-
ability of consent decree requests only briefly in dicta, as well as other 
cases that enforced consent decrees without reaching the jurisdic-
tional issue.178  The Pope Court went on to explain that a case is justi-
ciable if the court is required to “determine[] that the unchallenged 
 
171 Id. at 326. 
172 See, e.g., Effron, supra note 16, at 1811; Moss, supra note 167, at 1819 n.47. 
173 Swift, 276 U.S. at 326. 
174  Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 4 (1944). 
175 Id. at 8. 
176 Id. at 11. 
177 Id. at 12. 
178 Id. 
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facts shown of record establish a legally binding obligation” and “ad-
judicate[] the plaintiff’s right of recovery and the extent of it.”179  A 
consent decree in which the parties agree to both liability and relief, 
and the court is not required to make any independent legal or fac-
tual determinations, does not appear to fall within this holding.  
Thus, even the seminal Supreme Court cases on the issue fail to es-
tablish that consent decrees are consistent with Article III. 
D.  Article III’s Adverseness Requirement and Other Judicial Practices 
Some authorities—including Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. 
Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure treatise180—argue that consent 
decrees do not raise justiciability concerns because federal courts act 
in numerous other types of uncontested proceedings, by issuing cer-
tificates of naturalization, entering default judgments, granting un-
contested bankruptcies, accepting confessions of error, and receiving 
guilty pleas.181  These examples present interesting challenges to Arti-
cle III’s adverseness requirement but, upon close examination, do 
not suggest that a “case or controversy” may exist when all parties ask 
the court to enter the same judgment in a civil case.182 
1. Naturalization Proceedings 
Federal district courts throughout the country regularly naturalize 
new citizens, despite the fact that such proceedings, at least in the 
modern era, are typically uncontested.  Under current law, the judi-
ciary’s involvement in uncontested naturalizations is both ministerial 
and ceremonial, limited to issuing the oath of allegiance183 and “ad-
dress[ing] the newly naturalized citizen[s] upon the form and genius 
of our Government.”184  This role is a largely historical appurte-
 
179 Id. 
180 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3530 (3d ed. 
2013). 
181 See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:  The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 
1373–74 (1973) (noting that “it is difficult to assert that ‘real’ adversaries are necessary to 
the existence of a case or controversy”); Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bar-
gain:  Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE 
L.J. 887, 903 (stating that courts often issue orders in “a variety of non-adversarial con-
texts”). 
182 Cf. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (“[The] judicial power . . . is the 
right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants . . . .”). 
183 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(b)(1)(A), 1448(a) (2012). 
184 Id. § 1448a. 
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nance185 to a federal court’s main function and reveals little about Ar-
ticle III. 
In Tutun v. United States,186 the Supreme Court held that a federal 
appellate court had statutory jurisdiction to review a district court’s 
denial of a naturalization petition.  The opinion noted in passing that 
naturalization proceedings were “cases” under Article III, because 
“[t]he United States is always a possible adverse party,” but did not 
delve further into the question of adverseness.187 
This approach seems inconsistent with the Court’s core adverse-
ness jurisprudence.188  It is difficult to understand how a particular 
uncontested proceeding may be deemed sufficiently “adverse” to sat-
isfy Article III, based solely on the hypothetical possibility that the 
Government (or some other litigant) might contest some other mat-
ter that some other party brings under the same statute in the future.  
The fact that the Government is “always a possible adverse party” in 
certain types of suits, such as naturalization proceedings,189 does not 
establish that it actually is an adverse party in a particular case where 
it neither contests a person’s claims nor opposes their requested re-
lief. 
Tutun’s brief and incidental treatment of adverseness, which was 
not even the question at issue in the case, perhaps may be viewed as 
either an insufficiently considered assertion or an ad hoc exception 
to the Court’s core adverseness jurisprudence.  The Court’s reason-
ing also may have been driven by the role that state and federal 
courts have played in naturalization proceedings since the Founding 
Era,190 rather than more broadly applicable justiciability principles. 
It also may be pertinent that Tutun was issued before the rise of 
the administrative state.  The role that Tutun endorses for the judici-
ary—reviewing and adjudicating the substance of uncontested appli-
cations for citizenship191—is one that likely would be seen today as the 
proper role of an administrative agency rather than a federal court.  
 
185 Congress has granted state and federal courts power to naturalize citizens who satisfy 
statutory requirements since the Naturalization Act of 1790, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (Mar. 26, 
1790). 
186 270 U.S. 568, 580 (1926). 
187 Id. at 577.  The situation in Tutun was somewhat more complicated than the Court’s cur-
sory treatment of the adverseness issue may suggest because, at least by the appellate 
stage, the Government was arguing against the Petitioner’s position.  See 1925 J. SUP. CT. 
U.S. 179, 199. 
188 See supra Section II.A. 
189 Tutun, 270 U.S. at 577. 
190 See supra note 188. 
191 Tutun, 270 U.S. at 576–77. 
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Thus, the case may no longer present an accurate conception of the 
judicial power. 
Even if one accepts the validity of Tutun’s holdings, however, it 
could be argued that a distinction exists between a naturalization pe-
tition that the Government declines to oppose, or on which it takes 
no position, and a consent decree where the government affirmative-
ly consents to and joins in the plaintiff’s request for relief.  Indeed, 
the rules of civil procedure treat a failure to oppose a plaintiff’s 
claims very differently from an express stipulation or affirmative con-
sent.192  Thus, while naturalization proceedings—like the other ex-
amples discussed in this Section—may offer some support for the ju-
dicial practice of issuing consent decrees, they do not foreclose 
justiciability concerns about them. 
2. Default Judgments 
A default judgment differs substantially from a consent decree for 
Article III purposes.  When a plaintiff moves for default, the defend-
ant has not agreed that the plaintiff has a right to relief.  Rather, by 
failing to file a responsive pleading, the defendant implicitly admits 
only the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint.193  Despite its 
lack of participation, the defendant is not deemed to implicitly have 
assented to the validity of the plaintiff’s legal claims, the specific rem-
edies the plaintiff seeks, or entry of judgment against it.  As discussed 
earlier, courts retain an independent obligation to ensure the legal 
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims and the propriety of the requested 
relief, especially in government-defendant cases.194  Thus, despite a 
defendant’s lack of active opposition, the defendant in a default 
judgment case remains implicitly or formally opposed to the plain-
tiff—a presumption that is impossible to retain when the defendant 
expressly requests the same relief as the plaintiff through a proposed 
consent decree. 
 
192 See supra Section I.B (discussing the different standards that courts apply when confront-
ing the various procedural vehicles through which litigants can seek substantive rulings or 
judgments without having the court fully consider the merits of either the case or a par-
ticular issue within the case); see also Morley, supra note 77. 
193 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation . . . is admitted if a responsive pleading is required 
and the allegation is not denied.”); City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 
F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom’ that a defendant who 
defaults thereby admits all ‘well-pleaded’ factual allegations contained in the com-
plaint.”). 
194 See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
Feb. 2014] PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT DECREES   671 
 
3. Uncontested Bankruptcies 
Uncontested bankruptcies raise some of the same issues as both 
naturalization petitions and default judgments.  A creditor, of course, 
may unilaterally forgive a debtor’s obligations to it.  Indeed, all of a 
debtor’s creditors could agree to forgive her debts, either completely 
or with particular repayment terms, without judicial proceedings or 
bankruptcy. 
A debtor must seek a discharge through bankruptcy only if one or 
more creditors refuse to release her from her obligations.  The fact 
that the debtor and creditors cannot voluntarily resolve their conflicts 
among themselves establishes that they are adverse.  As with a default 
judgment, this underlying adverseness is not eliminated by the fact 
that a creditor might not find it economically worthwhile to contest a 
bankruptcy proceeding or have any colorable claims or defenses to 
raise.195  Moreover, when a petitioner files an uncontested bankrupt-
cy, a creditor who fails to contest it is simply taking no position on the 
issue.  Like an uncontested naturalization petition or default judg-
ment, this is distinguishable from a consent decree in which the de-
fendant both joins in the plaintiff’s request and affirmatively agrees 
to the requested relief. 
4. Confessions of Error 
Confessions of error also do not attenuate Article III’s adverseness 
requirements.  Adverseness has never been understood to mean that 
litigants must contest every possible issue of fact and law in a case; to 
the contrary, the pretrial process is geared largely toward narrowing 
the scope of contested issues that the court must resolve.196  Most con-
fessions of error, even on substantial points of law, are not wholly dis-
positive of the case and require remand for further adversarial pro-
ceedings, on remedy if nothing else.  Thus, a court’s decision to 
accept a confession of error does not suggest a complete lack of ad-
verseness in the underlying case. 
 
195 If debtors and creditors collectively settle upon a repayment plan and present it to a 
court, then that would be the substantive equivalent of a consent decree that the court 
(according to this Article) lacks jurisdiction to enter.  Such an agreement should be em-
bodied in a private contract, rather than a court order or consent decree. 
196 Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice:  The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial 
Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1746 (1992) (noting that pretrial informational dis-
closures give parties opportunities to narrow issues and eliminate meritless claims). 
672 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 16:3 
 
5. Guilty Pleas 
Guilty pleas present the closest analogue to consent decrees, par-
ticularly when they involve an agreement between the government 
and defendant as to both guilt and sentence.197  It could be argued 
that the longstanding and widely accepted practice of accepting 
guilty pleas establishes the justiciability of consent decrees.  Although 
federal courts ultimately derive their authority in both civil and crim-
inal matters from the same language in Article III, it may be that the 
constitutional requirements for a criminal “case or controversy” differ 
from those of a civil “case or controversy.” 198  
The civil and criminal justice systems serve fundamentally differ-
ent purposes from each other in numerous ways.  Moreover, the 
practice of accepting guilty pleas may be justified by compelling con-
siderations that do not apply to consent decrees in civil cases.  Con-
ceivably, the government and criminal defendants could settle crimi-
nal cases through private contracts requiring the defendant to serve a 
specified prison sentence, pay a fine, and agree to be designated a 
“felon.”  It generally would be regarded as intolerable for courts to be 
excluded from the criminal justice process in that manner, however, 
especially given the prevalence of plea bargaining.199  Having courts 
accept guilty pleas and enter judgments of conviction protects the 
constitutional rights of the defendant; ensures that waivers of those 
rights are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary;200 allows courts to 
maintain at least a degree of oversight over the executive branch’s 
prosecutorial power; and places a judicial imprimatur on convictions. 
No such compelling considerations apply to the civil justice sys-
tem.  Civil litigants commonly resolve their differences through pri-
vate settlement agreements.  Courts are neither expected nor re-
quired to play a role in most civil settlements, except in unusual 
circumstances such as class-action cases,201 because waivers of rights in 
civil cases are not subject to the same safeguards that apply in crimi-
 
197  A guilty plea that leaves a degree of sentencing discretion with the court is comparable to 
a stipulation of liability, which is insufficient in itself to defeat adverseness.   
198 Some scholars have offered a slightly different take, arguing that the term “cases” in Arti-
cle III includes both civil and criminal matters, while the term “controversies” is limited 
solely to civil matters.  William E. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State 
Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 265–67 (1990); Daniel J. Melt-
zer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1569, 1575 (1990). 
199 See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 859 (2000) (arguing that 
plea bargaining “has swept across the penal landscape”). 
200 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
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nal prosecutions.202  The need to maintain a degree of oversight over 
the executive branch is absent in most civil cases, as is the possibility 
that a person will be completely deprived of her freedom.  Thus, the 
constitutional and practical considerations that warrant interpreting 
Article III as permitting the acceptance of guilty pleas in criminal 
cases do not apply in the civil context.  While it is tempting to analo-
gize between guilty pleas and civil consent decrees, the differences 
between the civil and criminal justice systems preclude guilty pleas 
from serving as a basis for jettisoning Article III’s adverseness re-
quirement from the civil realm. 
E.  Other Arguments for the Justiciability of Consent Decrees 
Most defenses of the justiciability of consent decrees are based on 
either Swift203 and Pope,204 or analogies to other types of proceedings 
before federal courts that do not involve adverse parties; all of these 
arguments have been addressed in the Sections above.  Professor Ju-
dith Resnik contends that the very fact that a plaintiff seeks a consent 
decree “suggest[s] that, despite parties’ agreement to discontinue lit-
igation, a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ exists, enabling courts to have the 
authority to enter judgment.”205  The fact that one or more putative 
parties to a contract (such as a settlement agreement) might wish to 
embody that agreement in a court order, however, does not give rise 
to Article III adverseness or a justiciable controversy.  One can imag-
ine any number of agreements for which a risk-averse or distrustful 
signatory might wish to be able to invoke a court’s summary con-
tempt power; such a desire does not give rise to a justiciable contro-
versy. 
Professors Martin H. Redish and Adrianna D. Kastanek argue in-
stead that the Supreme Court’s holding in United States Bancorp Mort-
gage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership206 grants courts authority to enter 
consent decrees.207  Bancorp holds that, when a case becomes moot, a 
court may issue any orders that are “‘reasonably ancillary to [its] pri-
 
202 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (establishing a detailed procedure that courts must follow be-
fore accepting guilty pleas). 
203 Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928). 
204 Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1944). 
205 Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment?  Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of 
Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1514 (1994). 
206 513 U.S. 18 (1994). 
207 Redish & Kastanek, supra note 148, at 590. 
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mary, dispute-deciding function,’”208 in order to “‘make such disposi-
tion of the whole case as justice may require.’”209  Professors Redish 
and Kastanek argue that a “court’s ability to enter a consent decree 
that resolves previously adversarial litigation is appropriately viewed 
as ancillary to the adjudicatory process.”210 
This reading of Bancorp is too ambitious.  Bancorp recognizes that 
federal courts have the quintessentially housekeeping power to dis-
pose of cases that no longer present justiciable controversies; it does 
not authorize affirmative grants of substantive relief.  Imposing legal 
obligations on one or more parties is not “ancillary” to a court’s dis-
pute-deciding function, but rather a direct and substantial result of it.  
Bancorp does not allow courts to go beyond the administrative steps, 
such as dismissal211 and vacatur of lower-court opinions, necessary to 
dispose of a case that should no longer be pending. 
Perhaps the most compelling argument upon which supporters of 
consent decrees can rely is the judiciary’s largely unbroken historical 
practice of issuing them.212  Although longstanding practices going 
back to the nation’s Founding typically carry great weight in constitu-
tional interpretation,213 particularly in separation-of-powers contro-
versies,214 judicial practices concerning justiciability are not especially 
persuasive because the Court did not develop and begin enforcing 
many aspects of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement until 
relatively late in the nation’s history.215  Historical practice, therefore, 
 
208 Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 22 (quoting Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 
U.S. 74, 111 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in denial of writ of certiorari)). 
209 Id. at 21 (quoting Walling v. James v. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 677 (1944)). 
210 Redish & Kastanek, supra note 148, at 590. 
211 See Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29 (“The case is dismissed as moot.”). 
212 See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 323–24 (1928) (discussing pre-
Revolutionary English practice concerning consent decrees). 
213 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 213 (2003) (“[C]onsistent congressional practice is enti-
tled to very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established have 
not been disputed during a period of [over two] centur[ies], it is almost conclusive.” 
(quotation marks omitted)); see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 678 
(1970) (holding that an “unbroken practice” in constitutional interpretation “is not 
something to be lightly cast aside”). 
214 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826 (1997) (relying on “historical practice” in de-
termining the scope of legislative standing under Article III). 
215 Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. MEMPHIS L. REV. 727, 735 (2009) 
(“American Framing-era courts commonly entertained cases that would flunk the Su-
preme Court’s modern standing requirements.”); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a 
Government of, by, and for the People:  Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1, 66–67 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s opinions over the nation’s first 150 years 
[show] that direct injury was not a necessary element of a ‘case’ or ‘controversy.’”); see 
generally Pushaw, supra note 149 (arguing that the original understanding of the terms 
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is not an especially informative guide to Article III’s applicability to 
consent decrees.   
Consent decrees, therefore, raise strong Article III adverseness 
concerns—whether jurisdictional or merely prudential— that should 
make the judiciary reluctant to issue them.  Courts should require lit-
igants to enter into settlement agreements to terminate litigation, ra-
ther than approving consent decrees.  In most cases, the main impact 
of such a switch would be requiring litigants to invoke breach-of-
contract remedies, rather than summary contempt proceedings, if 
the agreement is violated.  As Part III explains, however, limiting gov-
ernment defendants to settlement agreements rather than consent 
decrees would preclude many of the separation-of-powers concerns 
that such decrees can create in public law cases. 
III.  CONSENT DECREES AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Justiciability concerns aside, consent decrees in government-
defendant cases raise serious separation-of-powers problems because 
they allow executive officials and agencies to improperly entrench 
their preferred policies, interpretations of the law, and enforcement 
priorities against changes by subsequent administrations, without hav-
ing a court decide whether such restrictions are legally or constitu-
tionally required.216  The leading critiques of government-defendant 
consent decrees contend that they therefore violate Article II.217  This 
Part offers a somewhat different view. 
Section A explains that Article II, as well as the Veto Clause of Ar-
ticle I,218 bar consent decrees that purport to limit power or discretion 
that the Constitution directly and specifically confers on the Presi-
dent, but such decrees tend to be rare.  Section B shows that similar 
Article II objections do not apply to consent decrees that limit power 
or discretion that statutes and regulations confer on the President or 
other executive branch officials—the category into which most con-
sent decrees in government-defendant cases fall.  Rather, such de-
crees are improper because Congress has not delegated authority to 
either the Attorney General or executive officials to permanently en-
 
“cases” and “controversies” as used in Article III allowed federal courts to hear certain 
types of matters that current justiciability doctrine prohibits). 
216 As explained in Part I, the standard for approving consent decrees is very lax and general-
ly does not require the court to consider the legal merits of the parties’ legal theories or 
even whether the plaintiff is entitled to relief.  See supra Section I.A. 
217 McConnell, supra note 16, at 300–01, 321; Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 237, 276. 
218 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
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trench restrictions on agencies’ discretion concerning regulations, 
policies, legal interpretations, or enforcement. 
A. Consent Decrees and Executive Powers Conferred by the Constitution 
As several commentators and OLC correctly conclude, Article II 
prohibits consent decrees that restrict powers and discretion that the 
Constitution directly and specifically confers on the President without 
the need for statutory mediation.219  Most of these constitutional 
grants of authority, such as the powers to recommend legislation or 
grant pardons, are set forth in Article II,220 although Article I confers 
the President’s veto power.221  Under this standard, the consent de-
cree in United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, which required 
the Government to “make every good faith effort to find and provide 
every available form of financial resources adequate for the imple-
mentation of [a school] desegregation plan” for Chicago,222 would be 
invalid under the Recommendations Clause,223 insofar as it required 
the President to seek appropriations from Congress or prohibited 
him from seeking to reduce financial aid to Chicago schools.224 
A consent decree that attempts to limit or control the President’s 
exercise of a constitutionally conferred power would conflict with, 
and effectively amend, the constitutional provision granting that au-
thority.  A sub-constitutional authority, such as a consent decree, 
cannot trump an express constitutional provision.225  Of course, a 
court may restrict of exercise of executive authority when necessary to 
enforce constitutional rights or other limits on governmental power, 
but courts do not make such merits-related determinations when issu-
ing consent decrees, and nothing in the Constitution suggests that a 
 
219 McConnell, supra note 16, at 319–20; OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25; see 
also Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 232–34. 
220 See U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl. 1; id. art. II § 3, cl. 1. 
221  Id. art. I, § 7. 
222 588 F. Supp. 132, 139 (N.D. Ill. 1984), vacated 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984). 
223 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. 
224 See Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 588 F. Supp. at 237–39, 242 (identifying acts “taken by the Ex-
ecutive Branch in connection with Congressional consideration” of school funding legis-
lation that purportedly violated the consent decree, and holding that the decree required 
the Executive Branch to engage in “lobbying activities” and “seek . . . reappropriation or 
new legislation when other sources of available funds prove inadequate”).  The Seventh 
Circuit interpreted the consent decree narrowly to avoid imposing such obligations on 
the President, but held that the executive branch’s interactions with Congress “contra-
vene[d] the spirit of the Decree” and did “not befit a signatory of the stature of the Unit-
ed States Department of Justice.”  Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 744 F.2d at 1308. 
225 OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25; McConnell, supra note 16, at 320. 
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President may impose his view or interpretation of the document on 
his successors. 
Professor Peter Shane rejects this approach, arguing that the Pres-
ident may agree to a consent decree that limits his constitutionally 
conferred authority so long as the either does not “prevent the exec-
utive from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions” or 
“is justified by an overriding need.”226  He relies on Nixon v. Adminis-
trator of General Services, in which the Supreme Court held that separa-
tion-of-powers problems arise only when one branch “‘prevents’” an-
other “‘from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.’”227 
This approach appears unavoidably subjective and ad hoc,228 and 
would dangerously permit de jure executive entrenchment of an in-
cumbent’s preferred policies or legal interpretations.  While the Nix-
on Court holding that Professor Shane embraces may be a reasonable 
way of addressing potential interbranch usurpations, it offers no pro-
tection against a President’s attempted entrenchment of restrictions 
on the office’s constitutional authority.  Thus, Article II should be 
read as precluding consent decrees that limit powers that the Consti-
tution expressly confers on the President. 
B.  Consent Decrees and Executive Powers Conferred by Statute or Regulation 
Some opponents of consent decrees go even further, arguing that 
Article II prevents executive agencies and officials from entering into 
many types of consent decrees that limit or control the exercise of 
their statutorily conferred powers and discretion,229 such as by requir-
ing them to interpret, apply, or enforce legal provisions in certain 
ways; promulgate certain regulations; or utilize certain tests or meth-
odologies when developing regulations.  One variant of this argu-
ment is based on the premise that the Article II Vesting Clause,230 
Take Care Clause,231 and/or general tripartite structure of the federal 
government guarantee the Executive the power to interpret statutes, 
decide what regulations to promulgate, and determine enforcement 
priorities.232 
 
226 Shane, supra note 16, at 258. 
227 Id. at 257–58 (quoting Nixon v. Admin. of Gov’t Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). 
228 Cf. McConnell, supra note 16, at 318–19 (arguing that Professor Shane’s proposed stand-
ard is “weak” and provides “no real protection at all”). 
229 McConnell, supra note 16, at 300–01, 321; Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 237, 276. 
230 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
231 Id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”). 
232 See McConnell, supra note 16, at 298, 300–01, 321; Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 230. 
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A closely related claim is that such decrees are inconsistent with 
the President’s four-year term, because they allow earlier administra-
tions to “preclud[e] subsequent Presidents from changing [their] 
policies.”233  Professor Michael W. McConnell argues, “If changes in 
policy have already been ruled out by binding and irrevocable 
agreements with private parties, then there is no point in holding 
[elections].”234 
These arguments read too much into Article II.  Article II does 
not require Congress to delegate authority to the executive branch to 
promulgate regulations, interpret statutes, or exercise discretion over 
how to enforce them.  At the extreme, Congress may specify all perti-
nent statutory details in painstaking and minute detail, deny agencies 
the ability to promulgate regulations,235 and either mandate or pro-
hibit enforcement of certain laws under various circumstances (per-
haps even creating a private right of action in case the executive fails 
to comply).236 
Likewise, the Constitution likely allows Congress to grant an agen-
cy the temporary ability, for only a specified period of time, to prom-
ulgate regulations, develop policies, and determine enforcement pri-
orities under a particular statute.  Congress may specify that the 
agency’s determinations as of the end of that period will be prospec-
tively binding on the agency into the indefinite future, unless and un-
til Congress chooses to override them (or otherwise amend the law).  
Nothing in either the Constitution or Supreme Court precedent sug-
gests that a congressional delegation of authority to the Executive 
Branch must be perpetual.  The end result on an agency (and succes-
sor administrations) once a temporally limited delegation expires 
would be the same as if Congress itself had codified all of the inter-
pretations and decisions that the agency made while the delegation 
remained in effect.  Such measures would not violate Article II. 
 
233 McConnell, supra note 16, at 298, 300 (arguing that “[a]ny attempt by a President to as-
sert legal control over the powers of his successors, unless specifically authorized, is a vio-
lation” of the constitutional provision “provid[ing] that Presidents shall serve four-year 
terms of office”). 
234 Id. at 300. 
235  Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is axiomatic that an ad-
ministrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulations is limited to the authori-
ty delegated by Congress.”). 
236 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (“Congress may limit an agency’s 
exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by 
otherwise circumscribing an agency’s power to discriminate among issues or cases it will 
pursue.”). 
Feb. 2014] PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT DECREES   679 
 
From the perspective of executive power, the key issue with con-
sent decrees thus appears to be a question of statutory interpreta-
tion—whether Congress expressly or implicitly authorized govern-
ment defendants to agree to them.237  If an agency’s organic statute or 
the Attorney General’s general litigation authority238 allowed a gov-
ernment defendant to agree to consent decrees, that authorization 
would not improperly limit the constitutional powers of future ad-
ministrations that would be bound by such decrees.  Executive offi-
cials generally have no Article II basis for demanding that Congress 
guarantee them a certain range of discretion.  Conversely, if federal 
laws cannot fairly be read as authorizing an agency to enter into con-
sent decrees (particularly consent decrees that impose legal re-
strictions or requirements on the agency beyond those required by 
federal law), then a consent decree involving that agency would be a 
statutory, rather than constitutional, violation.  Either way, there is no 
constitutional problem. 
Substantial arguments may be raised on both sides of the statutory 
issue of whether Congress has authorized federal agencies and offi-
cials to enter into consent decrees.  On the one hand, agencies’ or-
ganic statutes may be treated as implicitly authorizing consent de-
crees, based on congressional acquiescence in the longstanding 
practice of government defendants entering into them.  This argu-
ment is bolstered by the fact that Congress has enacted laws that reg-
ulate consent decrees in particular areas, such as antitrust.239 
OLC further suggests that at least part of the basis for government 
defendants’ ability to agree to consent decrees is the Attorney Gen-
eral’s statutory authority to represent the United States in litigation.240  
According to this argument, the power to litigate on behalf of federal 
agencies and officials necessarily includes the ability to settle such 
lawsuits on such terms as the Attorney General, in the exercise of his 
professional judgment, deems reasonable, including entering into 
consent decrees. 
 
237  Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 621 (1983) (“A contemporaneous 
and consistent construction of a statute by those charged with its enforcement combined 
with congressional acquiescence creates a presumption in favor of the administrative in-
terpretation, to which we should give great weight . . . .” (quotation marks omitted)). 
238 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“[T]he conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agen-
cy, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is re-
served to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney Gen-
eral.”); id. § 519 (“[T]he Attorney General shall supervise all litigation to which the 
United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party . . . .”). 
239 See Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). 
240 OLC Consent Decree Opinion, supra note 25 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519). 
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On the other hand, statutory delegations of authority to an agency 
generally are not interpreted as allowing the agency or its officials to 
limit their successors’ statutorily conferred discretion.  As the Su-
preme Court explained in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., an agency’s discretionary decisions are considered 
matters of policy that the agency may revise “on a continuing basis” 
and are not “carved in stone.”241  It seems unlikely that Congress 
would bar agencies from entrenching limits on successors’ discretion 
through traditional policymaking procedures, including formal 
rulemaking and adjudicatory processes, yet implicitly permit them to 
do so through consent decrees, which neither are subject to a de-
tailed merits review nor involve public participation.  Indeed, it would 
be odd to allow federal agencies to entrench particular legal interpre-
tations, policies, or enforcement schemes—particularly without a ju-
dicial determination that they are constitutionally or legally valid or 
required—simply to settle litigation, when agencies generally are re-
garded as lacking authority to engage in such entrenchment to pur-
sue other equally or even more important goals.242 
Similarly, it is far from clear that DOJ’s statutory right and power 
to represent federal agencies and officials in litigation implies the 
ability to agree to bind agencies to restrictions on their discretion or 
authority, beyond those that the agencies themselves otherwise would 
have the statutory authority to approve.  While an attorney represent-
ing a client may agree to settlements on the client’s behalf, an attor-
ney-client relationship cannot give the attorney authority to agree to 
arrangements to which the client would lack the independent legal 
authority to consent directly. 
Because consent decrees are subject to a serious risk of manipula-
tion, allow for circumvention of the traditional legislative and regula-
tory processes, and can lead to entrenchment of incumbents’ policy 
preferences, courts should be reluctant to infer congressional author-
ization for them absent a specific, clear statement to that effect.243  
Congress’s general grants of litigation authority to DOJ, therefore, 
should be seen as insufficient to authorize the use of consent decrees 
 
241 467 U.S. 837, 863, 865 (1984). 
242 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment:  A Reappraisal, 111 
YALE L.J. 1665 (2002) (arguing that the government can use entrenchment to achieve 
goals that otherwise would be difficult or impossible). 
243 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:  Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (arguing that clear 
statement requirements in statutory interpretation are a form of “quasi-constitutional 
law” that can provide “structural constitutional protections . . . [for] underenforced con-
stitutional norms”). 
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in government-defendant cases.  Thus, under current law, consent 
decrees raise separation-of-powers problems primarily because feder-
al defendants lack statutory authority to enter into them.244 
Although this critique of consent decrees is not constitutionally 
based, it is broader than other leading criticisms of them.  Professor 
McConnell, for example, argues that a consent decree is appropriate 
in a government-defendant case if the court could have issued such 
an order following a trial on the merits.245  He explains, “If govern-
ment lawyers, in an exercise of professional discretion, decide to 
compromise [by entering into a consent decree], this poses no more 
constitutional problem than would a similar litigated decree.”246  In 
Professor McConnell’s view, consent decrees raise entrenchment-
related concerns only when they “contain[] elements that differ from 
or go beyond what a court could order in a litigated judgment.”247 
Professor McConnell contends, in essence, that government de-
fendants should be permitted to concede liability and enter into con-
sent decrees, so long as the remedy is appropriately tailored and does 
not extend beyond what is necessary to correct the alleged legal viola-
tion.248  A government entity’s imposition of a permanent de jure lim-
itation on a successor’s discretion is statutorily improper, however, 
unless the law actually requires it.  Because courts do not adjudicate 
the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims when reviewing proposed consent 
decrees, the process provides no assurance that there is a sufficient 
constitutional or statutory basis for constraining future administra-
tions’ interpretive, regulatory, or enforcement authority. 
Professors Jeremy A. Rabkin and Neal E. Devins also have cau-
tioned against consent decrees in government-defendant cases, but 
only ones that (i) require the President to make or withhold “legisla-
tive and budgetary recommendations to Congress”; (ii) interfere with 
the executive’s “spending priorities”; or (iii) “unduly constrain” ex-
 
244 If Congress were expressly to authorize an agency to execute consent decrees, then the 
law would be subject to review primarily on delegation-related grounds, but the non-
delegation doctrine is virtually moribund.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Sec-
tion 1:  From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2100 (2004) 
(noting “courts’ unwillingness to enforce” a non-delegation norm). 
245 McConnell, supra note 16, at 302. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id.; cf. Alfred M. Mamlet, Reconsideration of Separation of Powers and the Bargaining Game:  
Limiting the Policy Discretion of Judges and Plaintiffs in Institutional Suits, 33 EMORY L.J. 685, 
686–87 (1984) (arguing that courts should afford government officials the broadest pos-
sible discretion in remedying constitutional violations in institutional or structural cases, 
rather than imposing detailed requirements). 
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ecutive discretion in “setting broad enforcement priorities.”249  Again, 
these points are valid but, like Professor McConnell’s argument, fo-
cus solely on the impropriety of certain remedies, rather than the ex-
istence of a consent decree itself or the concession of liability.  More-
over, Professors Rabkin and Devins do not demonstrate that we 
should be any less concerned about limitations on other areas of tra-
ditional executive discretion, such as the promulgation of regula-
tions, interpretation of statutes, or limitations on other agency poli-
cies.  Thus, while existing critiques of consent decrees raise valid 
concerns, they do not go far enough in identifying the actual basis 
and full scope of the problem.  While all consent decrees raise justici-
ability problems, those involving government defendants allow those 
entities to exceed their statutory authority, improperly entrench their 
policy preferences, and circumvent traditional legislative and regula-
tory processes. 
IV.  NEW APPROACHES TO CONSENT DECREES IN GOVERNMENT-
DEFENDANT CASES 
This Part recommends reforms to judicial doctrines concerning 
consent decrees.  Section A proposes the most far-ranging solution, 
urging courts to avoid the justiciability problems of consent decrees 
by refusing to issue them and requiring litigants—especially govern-
ment defendants—to execute private settlement agreements instead.  
In case courts are not willing to implement such a major change, Sec-
tion B offers a new framework for determining whether to approve 
consent decrees in government-defendant cases.  Most notably, this 
Section encourages courts to confirm that the plaintiffs have stated 
valid claims, ensure that the relief is adequately tailored to redressing 
the challenged harm, and facilitate intervention by third parties to 
help ensure that these other requirements are satisfied. 
A.  Settlement Agreements as a Replacement for Consent Decrees 
Because consent decrees raise serious justiciability concerns under 
Article III,250 courts should decline to issue them and instead require 
litigants that wish to end litigation voluntarily, on negotiated terms, 
to execute a settlement agreement.  A settlement agreement is a pri-
vate contract among some or all of the parties to a case that requires 
termination of the settling plaintiffs’ claims.  The defendants often 
 
249 Rabkin & Devins, supra note 16, at 276–77. 
250 See supra Part II. 
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agree to some concession, such as paying the plaintiffs, taking or re-
fraining from certain acts, dismissing counterclaims, or waiving or 
disclaiming certain alleged rights of their own. 
The settlement agreement itself, rather than a court order, speci-
fies the parties’ obligations toward each other and, in most cases, the 
court is not required to review or approve it.251  As litigants may stipu-
late to dismiss a case without the court’s approval, a court has little or 
no opportunity to reject most settlements.252  Indeed, the court may 
not even see the settlement agreement; many settlement agreements 
contain confidentiality clauses that prohibit public disclosure of their 
terms.253  A settlement agreement is enforceable in the same manner 
as any other contract:  through a breach-of-contract suit for compen-
satory damages or, if the requirements for equitable relief are satis-
fied, specific performance.254 
In general, a claim for breach of a settlement agreement must be 
brought in state court unless there is an independent basis for federal 
jurisdiction.255  The Supreme Court has held, however, that parties to 
a settlement agreement arising from a federal lawsuit may stipulate 
that the federal court in which that lawsuit was filed may exercise ju-
risdiction over disputes concerning the agreement.256 
Settlement agreements, as a type of contract, do not raise Arti-
cle III justiciability concerns, because the court is not issuing a sub-
stantive order that affirms or alters the parties’ legal rights and obli-
gations.  Rather, the court simply dismisses the case, which is the 
procedurally appropriate response when a live controversy no longer 
exists.257 
In cases between private parties, the main effect of requiring liti-
gants to use settlement agreements rather than consent decrees is 
that, when one party fails to satisfy its obligations, the other side must 
file a breach of contract suit, rather than pursue summary contempt 
 
251 As discussed below, see infra notes 297–98  and accompanying text, courts must approve 
settlement agreements in class action cases and certain types of federal statutory actions. 
252 See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
253 See Erik S. Knutsen, Keeping Settlements Secret, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 945, 945–46 (2010). 
254 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 382 (1994). 
255 Id.  
256 Id. at 381.  At least one circuit has questioned this strategy’s efficacy, holding that “juris-
dictional retention provisions, even when contained in court orders, will not enable par-
ties to return to federal court to litigate settlement disputes” unless some other basis ex-
ists for invoking the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.  Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of 
Separation:  Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 275, 305 (2010) (citing Lynch v. Samatamason, Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 
2002)). 
257 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21 (1994). 
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proceedings.258  Using settlement agreements instead of consent de-
crees would have the biggest impact in government-defendant cases, 
because settlement agreements allow agencies and officials to volun-
tarily resolve lawsuits without raising concerns about justiciability, 
separation of powers, or the defendants’ underlying statutory author-
ity.  In the event that the government enters into a settlement agree-
ment that declares a legal provision invalid and bars the government 
from enforcing it, requires the government to apply or enforce a pro-
vision in certain ways, or mandates that an agency promulgate partic-
ular regulations, a court likely would refuse to enforce the agreement 
against unwilling officials under the “reserved powers” doctrine. 
The reserved powers doctrine provides that a contract in which a 
governmental entity purports to refrain from enacting particular 
laws, or from enforcing or interpreting them in particular ways, gen-
erally is unenforceable.259  The doctrine recognizes that “the power of 
governing is a trust committed by the people to the government, no 
part of which can be granted away.”260 
[Government] agencies can govern according to their discretion, if with-
in the scope of their general authority, while in power; but they cannot 
give away nor sell the discretion of those that are to come after them, in 
respect to matters the government of which, from the very nature of 
things, must “vary with varying circumstances.”261 
The reserved powers doctrine originally was formulated under the 
Contracts Clause262 and applied to the States, but later rulings recog-
nize that it extends to the federal Government, as well.263  It is a nec-
essary implication of the Constitution itself.  Article I, § 8 begins with 
the phrase, “Congress shall have power,” and then confers eighteen 
different powers on it.264  Allowing the Government to enter into a 
 
258 For an in-depth discussion of the differences between settlement agreements and consent 
decrees, see DiSarro, supra note 256. 
259 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879). 
260 Id. at 820. 
261 Id.; see also U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1977) (holding that the re-
served powers doctrine prevents states from entering into contracts that require them to 
surrender an attribute of their sovereignty, but not financial agreements); cf. V.F. Zahodi-
akin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 1952) (explaining 
that the prohibition on “contract zoning” arises from a municipality’s inability to contract 
away part of its police power). 
262 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
263 See United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 888–89 (1996) (plurality opinion); Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982).  But see Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the 
Right to Govern:  Winstar and the Need to Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 
KY. L.J. 245, 264 (1999) (“The reserved powers doctrine is essentially an artifact of legal 
history.”). 
264 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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contract limiting or restricting the use of one of those powers effec-
tively would limit or modify that express grant of authority.  Just as a 
statute cannot bar Congress from exercising a constitutionally con-
ferred power,265 neither may an alternate sub-constitutional instru-
ment, such as a contract.266 
The reserved powers doctrine is a more generalized version of the 
“contract zoning” doctrine in land-use law, which many states have 
adopted.  The contract zoning doctrine generally prohibits munici-
palities and zoning officials from entering into contracts, including 
settlement agreements, in which they agree to grant variances, re-
zone parcels of land, or amend master land-use plans.267  One of the 
main justifications for this prohibition is that “[z]oning is an exercise 
of the police power to serve the common good and general welfare.  
It is elementary that the legislative function may not be surrendered 
or curtailed by bargain or its exercise controlled by the considera-
tions which enter into the law of contracts.”268  The reserved powers 
doctrine arises from the same considerations. 
 
265 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (5 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (“[I]f both the law and the consti-
tution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conforma-
bly to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disre-
garding the law . . . the constitution . . . must . . . govern[] the case . . . .”). 
266 Depending on one’s view of the nature of contract, it can be argued that a contract does 
not absolutely require an obligated party to perform or refrain from the specified acts, 
but rather gives the obligated party the choice of either satisfying its specified contractual 
obligations or paying damages to its counterparty.  See, e.g., United States v. Blankenship, 
382 F.3d 1110, 1133 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A] contract gives a party two equally viable op-
tions (perform or pay compensation), between which it is generally at liberty to 
choose.”).  Even under that view of contracts, however, a government defendant may 
avoid performing the acts specified in a settlement agreement simply by compensating 
the plaintiffs for the resulting damages, if any.  Under a consent decree, in contrast, the 
court can issue orders and use the coercive powers of civil and criminal contempt to force 
a government entity into compliance.  See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 487 U.S. 1251 
(1988) (upholding a daily fine of $1 million against a municipality until it complied with 
a court order).  Whether the reserved powers doctrine should bar plaintiffs from recover-
ing compensatory damages from a government defendant that breaches a settlement 
agreement is a separate issue beyond the scope of this Article. 
267 See, e.g., Dacy v. Ruidoso, 845 P.2d 793, 797 (N.M. 1992) (“[C]ontract zoning is illegal 
whenever it arises from a promise by a municipality to zone property in a certain man-
ner . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89–90 (Fla. 1956). 
268 V.F. Zahodiakin Eng’g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 86 A.2d 127, 131 (N.J. 1952); 
accord Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797; see also Ford Leasing Dev. Co. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Jef-
ferson, 528 P.2d 237, 240 (Colo. 1974); Haas v. Mobile, 265 So. 2d 564, 566 (Ala. 1972).  
Other cases explain that contract zoning is illegal because, by promising to “zone proper-
ty in a specified manner . . . a municipality preempts the power of the zoning authority to 
zone the property according to prescribed legislative procedures.”  Dacy, 845 P.2d at 797; 
see also Prock v. Town of Danville, 655 N.E.2d 553, 559–60 (Ind. App. 1995). 
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The “sovereign acts” doctrine is an alternate possible basis upon 
which a court may refuse to enforce certain settlement agreements or 
other contracts with government defendants, although its applicabil-
ity is far less likely following the Supreme Court’s ruling in United 
States v. Winstar Corp.269  The sovereign acts doctrine provides that “the 
United States when sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an 
obstruction to the performance of the particular contract resulting 
from its public and general acts as a sovereign.”270  Under this princi-
ple, “‘Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or 
executive, so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed 
specially to . . . violate the particular contracts into which it enters 
with private persons.’”271  Whereas the reserved powers doctrine fo-
cuses on the validity and enforceability of the original agreement, the 
sovereign acts doctrine imposes some limits on the types of subse-
quent official actions that may be considered breaches of a generally 
enforceable agreement. 
The sovereign acts doctrine ensures that, if the government enters 
the marketplace in a “nonregulatory capacity,” by executing a con-
tract in the same capacity as a private entity, it does not thereby im-
plicitly limit its ability to act in its sovereign “regulatory capacity.”272  
The Court held that the doctrine was inapplicable in Winstar because 
the Government had entered into the contracts at issue there in a 
“fused” combination of “‘regulatory’ and ‘nonregulatory’ capaci-
ties.”273  The doctrine likely would be similarly inapplicable to an 
agreement settling a case challenging the validity, interpretation, or 
enforcement of a legal provision, because the government would en-
ter any such agreement in “fused” regulatory and nonregulatory ca-
pacities, if not exclusively in its regulatory capacity. 
A second obstacle to applying the sovereign acts doctrine in this 
context is that it prevents only “public and general” acts of the gov-
ernment from constituting a breach of a government contract.274  
Winstar held that a government act is not public and general “if it has 
the substantial effect of releasing the Government from its contractu-
al obligations.”275  Although the exact scope of this ruling is not well 
 
269 518 U.S. 839, 891–910 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
270 Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925). 
271 Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865)). 
272 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 892–94. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 895–96 (citing Jones, 1 Ct. Cl. at 385). 
275 Id. at 899. 
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defined,276 it is reasonably arguable that, if the Government agrees to 
refrain from enforcing a legal provision, to interpret or enforce a 
provision in a particular manner, or to promulgate certain regula-
tions, then any contrary actions would have the “substantial effect” of 
violating the agreement. 
Even if a court rejected all of these doctrines and held that a set-
tlement agreement invalidating, definitively construing, or requiring 
enforcement of a legal provision were valid, the court would be un-
likely to grant specific performance.  “[E]ven where courts have 
found that a legislature is bound by the contractual promises of a 
former legislature, the remedy is simply damages, not enforcement of 
a legislative scheme that the future body does not favor.”277  A court 
also has the further alternative of treating the settlement agreement 
as rescinded, rejuvenating the original legal challenge.  Thus, unlike 
consent decrees, executive officials cannot use settlement agreements 
to circumvent statutory limitations on their authority or entrench 
their preferred constitutional and policy preferences in a legally en-
forceable manner.278 
Allowing government defendants to enter into settlement agree-
ments, but not consent decrees, would best balance the competing 
interests at stake in a public law case.  If a government agency or offi-
cial agrees with a litigant concerning the proper interpretation, ap-
plication, or enforcement of a legal provision, it is free to voluntarily 
adopt that approach as an exercise of its executive or prosecutorial 
discretion,279 and embody that agreement in a settlement. 
Of course, from a plaintiff’s perspective, settlement agreements 
are less desirable than consent decrees because they cannot be en-
forced through summary contempt proceedings, and future admin-
 
276 See Connor Bros. Constr. Co. v. Geren, 550 F.3d 1368, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (examin-
ing several factors in determining whether the Army’s challenged actions were “public 
and general”). 
277 John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation:  A Reply to Pro-
fessors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1781 (2003). 
278 To the extent that settlement agreements do pose such a threat, it might be worthwhile to 
consider whether some or all of this Article’s procedural recommendations concerning 
consent decrees should apply to them.  See infra Section IV.B.  Because litigants have vir-
tually unlimited discretion to dismiss pending litigation by stipulation, FED. R. CIV. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(ii), and courts generally have no opportunity to review, and are not required 
to approve, settlement agreements, extending this Article’s recommendations to such 
agreements would require more substantial changes to existing rules and procedures. 
279 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  The fact that the agency performs certain acts or 
omissions pursuant to a settlement agreement does not change their substantive legality, 
which may be challenged by adversely affected third parties. 
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istrations that have different views of the law may choose to abrogate 
them.  As discussed above, the reserved powers doctrine, restrictions 
on specific performance, and potentially even the sovereign acts doc-
trine likely would prevent plaintiffs from enforcing agreements 
against unwilling successors.  At most, an aggrieved plaintiff may be 
able to seek damages or have its agreement vacated and the underly-
ing lawsuit reinstated.  These limitations, however, are the unavoida-
ble consequences of agencies’ general lack of statutory authority to 
entrench particular policies or interpretations of the law and irrevo-
cably impose them on their successors.   
Despite their limitations, settlement agreements can play a valua-
ble role in allowing plaintiffs to negotiate agreeable resolutions to 
cases against government defendants.  Institutional inertia may con-
tribute to the “stickiness” of settlement agreements, regardless of 
their legal enforceability.  Moreover, if a plaintiff’s legal theory is 
sound and a court likely would rule in its favor, then subsequent ad-
ministrations would be unlikely to nullify a negotiated settlement.280  
Successor administrations are most likely to abrogate settlement 
agreements where the plaintiffs’ underlying claims are weak or the 
legal issues are unsettled, but these are precisely the types of cases for 
which we would not want an incumbent administration to irrevocably 
bind its successors without a court ruling on the merits, and for which 
judicial resolution of the issues is desirable.  Thus, using settlements 
instead of consent decrees not only prevents Article III justiciability 
problems but also, in the context of government-defendant cases, 
helps prevent government officials and agencies from entrenching 
their policy preferences and making permanent commitments to 
which they lack the legal authority to agree. 
B.  Procedural Safeguards for Consent Decrees in Government-Defendant 
Cases 
If courts are unwilling to abandon the use of consent decrees al-
together, then they should implement additional safeguards in gov-
 
280 Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 22–24 (explaining how the likelihood of favorable or 
adverse court rulings affects parties’ incentives); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (argu-
ing that “the outcome that the law will impose” if a case is litigated affects the behavior 
and bargaining of the potential litigants); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection 
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (arguing that the likelihood that a 
particular dispute will result in litigation depends on the “expected costs to parties of fa-
vorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of 
success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement”). 
Feb. 2014] PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT DECREES   689 
 
ernment-defendant cases to alleviate separation-of-powers concerns, 
ensure that agencies do not agree to decrees that exceed their statu-
tory authority, and minimize improper entrenchment.  Individual 
courts could implement many of the reforms suggested in this Sec-
tion as exercises of their equitable discretion when considering pro-
posed consent decrees.  The Supreme Court similarly might be able 
to impose most of them through its inherent power over judicial ad-
ministration.281  Alternatively, these reforms could be implemented 
through amendments to either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
or Title 28. 
Subsection 1 discusses the substantive standards courts should 
employ in reviewing proposed consent decrees in government-
defendant cases, and procedural requirements that would aid in such 
review.  Subsection 2 explains the steps courts should take to facilitate 
intervention in such cases, which could substantially improve their 
review of proposed decrees under the heightened standards this Arti-
cle proposes. 
1.  Standards for Approval 
A court should not issue a consent decree in a government-
defendant case unless, in addition to the factors set forth in Local No. 
93 being satisfied,282 the court determines that (i) the plaintiff has 
stated valid claims and (ii) the relief is closely tailored to remedy the 
legal violations at issue.  Requiring courts to review the legal suffi-
ciency of plaintiffs’ claims would go a long way toward remedying one 
of the main problems with consent decrees in government-defendant 
cases—that the court lacks a legally valid basis for issuing them. 
Because a consent decree is a hybrid between a contract and a 
court order, its validity depends on either the parties’ consent or the 
court’s authority to remedy legal violations.  As discussed earlier, 
agencies generally do not have statutory authority to limit their suc-
cessors’ exercise of their statutorily delegated policy-making, inter-
pretive, or enforcement authority.  Thus, a court order validly may 
impose such restrictions only if they are appropriately tailored re-
sponses to actual constitutional or statutory violations. 
Courts are well-positioned to engage in these merits-related in-
quiries.  Many government-defendant cases in which a plaintiff seeks 
injunctive relief (other than a structural or institutional injunction) 
 
281 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472–73 (1965). 
282 Local No. 93, Int’l Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986). 
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can be resolved largely as a matter of law.  They involve challenges to 
the constitutionality of legal provisions; the substantive validity of 
agency regulations, policies, or procedures; the sufficiency of the 
process underlying an agency issuance; an agency’s decision to en-
force or not enforce a particular legal provision; and the like.  The 
pertinent evidence tends to be “legislative”-type facts contained with-
in the administrative record, which is subject to judicial notice and 
may be considered in determining whether a complaint states a valid 
claim.283 
The Supreme Court adopted a comparable approach toward con-
fessions of error in Young v. United States.284  The Young Court held 
that agreement between the Government and its opponent on a legal 
principle “does not relieve th[e] Court of the performance of the ju-
dicial function.”285  The Court recognized that it has a “judicial obliga-
tion[] . . . to examine independently the errors confessed.”286  Alt-
hough the Court abandoned that approach several decades later,287 
the Young Doctrine is well-suited for both confessions of error and 
proposed consent decrees; it allows courts to ensure that the judicial 
power is exercised in response only to actual statutory or constitu-
tional violations. 
After ascertaining that a plaintiff properly has alleged an actual 
legal violation, the court also should ensure the propriety of the re-
quested relief.  Although government officials and agencies may 
choose to enact policies and procedures that go beyond the constitu-
tionally or statutorily required minimum, they generally may not bind 
their successors to those decisions.288  Because government entities 
lack statutory power to entrench their policy preferences and limit 
their successors’ discretion, a court should not impose such re-
strictions through a consent decree unless they are a closely tailored 
means of remedying a constitutional or statutory violation. 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) already applies a strict 
variation of this standard to “[p]rospective relief” in litigation con-
 
283 See Marshall Cnty. Health Care Auth. v. Shalala, 988 F.2d 1221, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a district court may examine matters of public record in ruling on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion). 
284 315 U.S. 257 (1942). 
285 Id. at 258. 
286 Id. at 258–59. 
287 Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 171 (1996) (holding that the Court will accept any 
“plausible” confession of error without further considering the merits of the underlying 
issue). 
288 See generally supra Part III. 
Feb. 2014] PROBLEMS WITH CONSENT DECREES   691 
 
cerning “prison conditions.”289  It provides that such relief “shall ex-
tend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 
right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.”290  The PLRA adds, “The 
court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the 
court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least 
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal 
right.”291 
The Supreme Court has applied a comparable standard in fully lit-
igated constitutional cases.  In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 
the Court held that a desegregation remedy may cover only the “in-
cremental segregative effect [that constitutional] violations had on 
the racial distribution of the . . . school population as presently con-
stituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have 
been in the absence of such constitutional violations.” 292  Similarly, in 
Califano v. Yamasaki, the Court reiterated that “injunctive relief 
should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to 
provide complete relief for the plaintiffs,” based on the nature of 
their claims.293  Imposing such requirements on the scope of relief in 
consent decrees ensures that government defendants cannot use 
them as a way of improperly enhancing their authority by gratuitously 
entrenching their policy preferences and discretionary determina-
tions into law. 
The lack of adverseness between the parties seeking a consent de-
cree can hinder a court’s ability to accurately determine the legal suf-
ficiency of the plaintiff’s claims and the propriety of the requested re-
lief.  The next Subsection discusses various steps that courts should 
take to facilitate intervention by third parties to provide helpful anal-
ysis and authorities.  Especially because intervenors may not be avail-
able to oppose a consent decree, however, the court also should re-
quire a government defendant seeking a consent decree to file an 
Anders-type brief, identifying and responding to potential legal argu-
 
289 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A)(2006). 
290 Id. 
291 Id.; see also id. § 3626(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii) (“The court shall not order any prospective relief 
that requires or permits a government official to exceed his or her authority under State 
or local law . . . unless—(i) federal law requires such relief . . . ; (ii) the relief is necessary 
to correct the violation of a Federal right; and (iii) no other relief will correct the viola-
tion of the Federal right.”). 
292 433 U.S. 406, 420 (1977); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 
(1989) (requiring that any race-conscious relief to remedy the effects of past discrimina-
tion be “narrowly tailored”). 
293 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). 
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ments that reasonably could be raised against the plaintiffs’ claims or 
requested relief. 
In Anders v. California, the Supreme Court established a special 
briefing requirement for a court-appointed attorney who wishes to 
withdraw from representing a criminal defendant in a statutorily 
guaranteed appeal on the grounds that there are no potentially col-
orable issues to litigate.294  The Court held that the attorney must file 
a “brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably sup-
port the appeal. . . . [T]he court—not counsel—then proceeds, after 
full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is 
wholly frivolous.”295  These requirements would be somewhat modi-
fied in the context of a consent decree, requiring the government de-
fendant to demonstrate that the proposed consent decree satisfies 
the standards proposed above and respond to a reasonable range of 
potential counterarguments.  If litigants wish a court to memorialize 
a settlement with a government defendant in an order that binds sub-
sequent administrations—entrenchment of a type to which the gov-
ernment defendant could not consent on its own—it is reasonable to 
require that the moving parties demonstrate that such relief is legally 
appropriate. 
Courts also generally should be required to hold hearings on pro-
posed consent decrees, at which intervenors can present contrary ar-
guments and the court can question the parties about the sufficiency 
of the government defendant’s Anders-type brief.  These require-
ments undoubtedly will increase the time it takes for litigants in gov-
ernment-defendant cases to obtain consent decrees, but such delays 
almost always accompany the incorporation of additional procedural 
protections into an administrative or judicial process.  Courts already 
must hold hearings or otherwise engage in substantial reviews of set-
tlements in numerous contexts, such as class actions296 and antitrust 
cases,297 so these requirements should be feasible. 
2.  Facilitating Intervention 
When government defendants seek to enter into consent decrees, 
the court also should facilitate intervention by third parties to ensure 
 
294 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
295 Id. 
296 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (providing that a court may approve a settlement in a class action 
case “only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate”). 
297 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)–(g) (2006) (requiring a court to determine that an antitrust consent 
decree is in the public interest before approving it). 
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that the pertinent legal issues are adequately and accurately present-
ed, and that the proposed decree is appropriate.  Intervenors’ partic-
ipation can help ensure the accuracy of the court’s conclusion by of-
fering a more adversarial presentation of the issues and identify the 
weaknesses, oversights, and omissions in the settling parties’ argu-
ments. 
As an initial matter, courts should require government defendants 
seeking a consent decree to file a public notice and a copy of their 
Anders-type brief in the Federal Register.  Such notice already is re-
quired in antitrust298 and environmental cases,299 among others.  This 
notice will alert third parties that intervention may be necessary to 
defend the legal provision, policy, or governmental act at issue. 
Courts also should apply Rule 24’s standards for intervention lib-
erally in this context.300  Third parties seeking to intervene to defend 
legal provisions or administrative actions that government defendants 
no longer wish to uphold often face a variety of obstacles.  First, some 
courts have held that, when litigants seek to settle weeks, months, or 
years after a case was filed, a motion to intervene to attempt to block 
the proposed settlement is untimely.301  Timeliness under these cir-
cumstances should be measured from the date the motion for a con-
sent decree is filed, not from the outset of the case.  The public is en-
titled to assume that government defendants will vigorously defend 
against challenges to legal provisions and administrative determina-
tions.  They should not be given an incentive to file protective inter-
vention motions at the outset of cases, before a substantial need to in-
tervene has arisen. 
Second, some courts also bar litigants from intervening in gov-
ernment-defendant cases on the grounds that defending legal provi-
sions and other governmental acts is the responsibility of the Attor-
ney General, who is presumed to adequately represent putative 
intervenors’ interests.302  When the Attorney General seeks a consent 
 
298 Id. § 16(b). 
299 42 U.S.C. § 9622(i)(1) (2006). 
300 FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
301 See, e.g., Cnty. of Orange v. Air Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he fact that 
[the putative intervenor] waited until after all the parties had come to an agreement after 
five years of litigation should . . . weigh heavily against [it].”); see also Choike v. Slippery 
Rock Univ., 297 F. App’x 138, 141 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that intervention was untimely 
in part because it threatened to “‘derail’ the settlement”). 
302 See, e.g., Curry v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 167 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(“[W]hen a government entity is a party and the case concerns a matter of sovereign in-
terest, the government is presumed adequately to represent the interests of the public.”); 
Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 1005 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hen the putative rep-
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decree, however, and the adverseness in the underlying case evapo-
rates, an intervenor can help the court confirm that the requirements 
proposed above for granting a consent decree have been satisfied.303  
Furthermore, if the Attorney General wishes to concede the validity 
of the plaintiff’s claims, then she cannot be adequately representing 
the interests of private parties that would oppose them. 
Third, courts have denied requests for permissive intervention to 
oppose consent decrees on the grounds that they would prolong the 
proceedings.304  As discussed above, however, prolonging proceedings 
regarding consent decrees is, to some extent, desirable to prevent 
them from being abused. 
Finally, courts should allow intervenors to rely on “piggyback” 
standing to join cases, rather than requiring them to demonstrate Ar-
ticle III standing in their own right.  In general, intervenors are not 
required to establish their own Article III standing to join a case, but 
rather may “piggyback” on the standing of the existing parties.305  
Courts typically hold that this piggyback standing evaporates when 
the district court enters a consent decree.  To remain in the case and 
appeal the decree, an intervenor must establish independent Article 
III standing, which they often are unable to do.306 
As discussed in Part II, when litigants reach a consensus and seek 
judicial approval of a consent decree, a justiciable controversy no 
longer exists between them, and the court should dismiss the lawsuit 
rather than enter a substantive order that declares or modifies the 
parties’ rights and obligations.  If a court rejects that approach, how-
ever, and concludes that it has jurisdiction to enter a consent decree, 
then the decree should not terminate the existence of the controver-
sy between the litigants until it is finalized through the exhaustion 
 
resentative is a governmental body or officer charged by law with representing the inter-
ests of the absentee, a presumption of adequate representation arises . . . .”). 
303 See supra Subsection IV.B.1. 
304 See, e.g., Bloomington v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 824 F.2d 531, 536–37 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that intervention would prejudice the litigants because of the time they had in-
vested in negotiating a settlement). 
305 Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[I]ntervenors in 
this circuit may in some cases be permitted to ‘piggyback’ upon the standing of original 
parties to satisfy the standing requirement.”); see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 
(1986) (“[T]his ability to ride ‘piggyback’ on the State’s undoubted standing exists only if 
the State is in fact an appellant before the Court . . . .”). 
306 Dillard, 495 F.3d at 1336 (holding that intervenors failed to allege a particularized injury-
in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing independent of the original parties); Dia-
mond, 476 U.S. at 55 (“[A]n intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence of the 
party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the in-
tervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art[icle] III. ”). 
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of—or expiration of the period for—appellate review.  This approach 
would allow putative intervenors to invoke piggyback standing to ap-
peal the propriety of the decree, particularly if the court adopts the 
standards that this Article recommends. 
CONCLUSION 
A consent decree is a potent mechanism through which govern-
ment agencies and officials can impose legal obligations on their suc-
cessors, entrench their policy preferences, and limit the discretion of 
future administrations.  They are much more pernicious than settle-
ment agreements because critical limitations, such as the reserved 
powers doctrine and the general prohibition on specific performance 
of government contracts, do not apply to them. 
Consent decrees exceed the bounds of courts’ Article III powers.  
When litigants reach agreement on their respective rights and seek a 
consent decree from the court, neither adverseness nor a justiciable 
controversy continues to exist between them.  The proper course is 
for the court to direct the parties to embody their understanding in a 
settlement agreement and dismiss the case, rather than issuing a sub-
stantive order that declares, establishes, or modifies the parties’ legal 
obligations without adversarial testing or argument. 
In most cases, the use of a consent decree rather than a settlement 
agreement affects only the remedies available to the litigants for al-
leged breaches.  Settlement agreements may be enforced only 
through breach-of-contract claims, while consent decrees may be en-
forced through summary contempt proceedings.  In government-
defendant cases, however, the limitations that apply to government 
contracts ensure that government agencies and officials cannot use 
settlement agreements to exceed their statutory authority by en-
trenching their policy preferences and limiting their successors’ stat-
utorily conferred discretion.  Because courts generally do not apply 
such limitations to consent decrees and subject them to only a mini-
mal level of scrutiny,307 government entities can use them to elevate 
discretionary legal interpretations and policy determinations into le-
gally binding mandates and restrictions on their successors.  If courts 
continue to issue consent decrees despite the Article III adverseness 
concerns, then they should limit the potential for abuse by requiring 
a government defendant seeking one to demonstrate that the plain-
 
307 See supra Part I. 
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tiff has stated valid claims and that the relief is an appropriate remedy 
for the violations at issue. 
